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The United States Congress recently authorized the appointment of 
a Commission on Structural Alternatives for the Federal Courts of 
Appeals. 1 That entity has an historic opportunity to analyze carefully 
the federal appellate system and make valuable suggestions for 
improvement, thereby charting the destiny of the intermediate appeals 
courts for the twenty-first century. The creation of this new commission 
is important because now is a critical time for the appellate courts. All 
twelve regional circuits have experienced exponential docket growth but 
have possessed insufficient resources to treat the cases: this crisis of 
volume now seriously threatens the system. 
The Commission on Revision of the Federal Court Appellate System 
(Hruska Commission), which completed its work2 a quarter century ago, 
performed the last assessment that thoroughly scrutinized the appeals 
courts and enjoyed national recognition and respect. The timing of the 
Hruska Commission study was significant, as the early 1970s was the 
period when the regional circuits first began to encounter the dramatic 
rise in appeals that transformed the courts over the course of a 
generation.3 Because there is a crucial need to explore the appellate 
courts' condition and means of improving those circumstances, the 
1. See Pub. L. No. 105-119, § 305, 111 Stat 2440, 2491-92 (1997). 
2. See COMMISSION ON REVISION OF THE FEDERAL COUIIT APPELLATE SYSTEM, THE 
GEOGRAPHICAL BOUNDARIES OF THE SEVERAL JUDICIAL CIRCUITS: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR 
CHANGE, 62 F.R.D. 223 (1973) [hereinafter HRUSKA COMMISSION). 
3. See id. at 227. 
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recently-authorized study deserves analysis. This Article undertakes that 
effort. 
The Article initially considers the developments that led Congress to 
approve a new commission. The background is particularly significant 
because assessment of the mandate that Congress assigned the entity 
suggests that the charge is unclear, very general, and amenable to 
multiple plausible interpretations. The convoluted and complex-if not 
arcane-legislative process that yielded the authorizing statute addition-
ally frustrates understanding. For example, a House-Senate Conference 
Committee adopted the study measure as a substitute for an appropria-
tions rider that would have divided the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Ninth Circuit.4 The commission, therefore, was ultimately the 
product of congressional machinations which had quite different 
purposes and of lengthy, controversial negotiations among senators and 
representatives who held extraordinarily diverse views. 
These propositions mean that Congress effectively left significant 
features of the entity's evaluation and its recommendations to the 
discretion of commission members and their staff. For instance, the 
authorizing legislation requires that the entity focus on the Ninth Circuit, 
but it is unclear how much emphasis this court should receive.5 
Moreover, the commission and the staff must expeditiously resolve these 
issues, so that the entity can discharge its daunting assignment in the 
exceedingly short compass afforded. The Article accordingly probes the 
events that preceded adoption of the study commission statute to 
ascertain precisely what Congress intended. This inquiry proves 
somewhat inconclusive, although it _is possible to extract certain ideas 
from the relevant legislative history. 
The Article concludes with recommendations for conducting the 
study. Because all of the appeals courts have experienced burgeoning 
dockets over the last quarter-century and have developed a broad 
spectrum of measures for treating them, the entire system warrants 
comprehensive analysis. The finest solutions for the problems that every 
appellate court confronts can only be crafted after the commission 
systemically collects, assesses and synthesizes the maximum relevant 
empirical data on increasing appeals and mechanisms for addressing 
caseload growth. Once the entity has compiled and consulted the largest 
quantity of accurate information, it should be possible to identify the 
best remedies for the difficulties that the regional circuits will face in 
the twenty-first century. 
4. See infra text accompanying notes 162-63. 
5. See infra text accompanying notes 166-76. 
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I. ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT OF A NATIONAL 
STUDY COMMISSION 
[Vol.49 
The origins and development of the recently-authorized national 
commission to study the appeals courts deserve comprehensive treatment 
in this Article, although certain aspects of the history have been 
examined elsewhere.6 Relatively thorough evaluation of the relevant 
background is justified because this type of assessment should increase 
understanding of the national study approved by Congress. 
A. General Background 7 
Congress implemented the modern appellate system by adopting the 
Circuit Court of Appeals Act of 1891, which was popularly known as 
the Evarts Act.8 Congress subsequently established two new appeals 
courts while reconfiguring the boundaries of two appellate courts.9 In 
1948, Congress formally added the United States Court of Appeals for 
the District of Columbia Circuit, 10 which primarily hears appeals of 
federal administrative agency decisions. 11 In 1982, Congress created the 
Federal Circuit and afforded the court national jurisdiction over cases 
6. See, e.g., Thomas E. Baker, On Redrawing Circuit Boundaries-Why the Proposal to 
Divide the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit Is Not Such a Good Idea, 22 
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 917, 918-23 (1990) (providing a brief overview of changes in federal circuit court 
boundaries from 1789 to 1982); Carl Tobias, An Analysis of Federal Appellate Court Study 
Commissions, 74 DENVER U. L. REV. 65, 65-69 (1996) (reviewing the activities of the 104th 
Congress "relative to the possible division of the Ninth Circuit"); see also NINTH CIRCUIT 
COUIIT OF APPEALS REoRGANIZATION ACT OF 1995, s. REP. No. 197, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. 
(1995) [hereinafter SENATE REPORT]. 
7. I rely in this subsection on Carl Tobias, The Impoverished Idea of Circuit-Splitting, 
44 EMORY L.J. 1357 (1995). 
8. See Act of Mar. 3, 1891, ch. 517, 26 Stat. 826 (current version at 28 U.S.C. §§ 41-49 
(1994)). See generally FELIX FRANKFUIITER & JAMES M. LANDIS, THE BUSINESS OF THE 
SUPREME COUIIT: A STUDY IN THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL SYSTEM 103-27 (1927) (describing the 
successes and failures of the Evarts Act in preparing the federal judiciary for "an era which 
transformed the whole political and legal picture of the United States"). 
9. See Baker, supra note 6, at 921-22; Tobias, supra note 7, at 1360. 
10. See Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 646, § 41, 62 Stat. 869, 870 (current version at 28 
u.s.c. § 41 (1994)). 
11. See Colloquy, The Contribution of the D.C. Circuit to Administrative Law, 40 ADMIN. 
L. REV. 507, 509 (1988) (describing the District of Columbia Circuit as "de facto, an 
administrative law court"); Spottswood W. Robinson, ill, The D.C. Circuit: An Era of Change, 
55 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 715, 715 (1987); see also Patricia M. Wald, Life on the District of 
Columbia Circuit: literally and Figuratively Halfway Between the Capitol and the White House, 
72 MINN. L. REV. l, l, 4 (1987) (describing the importance of separation of powers issues in 
cases before the District of Columbia Circuit). 
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that primarily implicate customs, patents, trademarks, copyrights, and 
claims against the United States.12 
During 1929, Congress established the Tenth Circuit Court of 
Appeals by removing Colorado, Kansas, New Mexico, Oklahoma, Utah, 
and Wyoming from the Eighth Circuit and leaving Arkansas, Iowa, 
Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, North Dakota, and South Dakota in that 
court.13 Docket congestion in the Eighth Circuit prompted Congress to 
form the new appeals court.14 
Growing caseloads only became a systemic problem after the mid-
twentieth century, however. Congress has vastly expanded federal court 
jurisdiction since that time. It has created numerous new civil actions 
and many additional crimes which, for example, fostered a 200 percent 
annual increase in appeals during the last two decades. 15 Congress did 
authorize many additional appellate court judgeships, but too few to 
resolve the substantial number of increasingly complex civil and 
criminal appeals that parties pursued. 16 All of the regional circuits have 
responded to burgeoning caseloads principally by imposing limitations 
on the number of written opinions that the appellate courts issue and 
oral arguments that they grant and by relying substantially on support 
staff.17 
It is important to understand that-there is significant variation among 
the twelve regional circuits. All of the courts have experienced 
expanding dockets, although they have done so at different times, and 
at diverse rates. The circuit courts also have had varying resources, 
especially judges, to treat the rising appeals. They have employed 
various measures to address the mounting caseloads. 
12. See Act of Apr. 2, 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, § 101, 96 Stat 25 (current version at 
28 U.S.C. § 41 (1994)). See generally Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, The Federal Circuit: A Case Study 
in Specialized Courts, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (1989) (analyzing the patent jurisdiction of the 
Federal Circuit); Symposium, United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit: Tenth 
Anniversary Commemorative Issue, 41 AM. U. L. REV. 559-1074 (1992). 
13. See Act of Feb. 28, 1929, ch. 363, 45 Stat. 1346, 1347 (current version at 28 U.S.C. 
§ 41 (1994)). 
14. See Baker, supra note 6, at 923. See generally Arthur J. Stanley & Irma S. Russell, 
The Political and Administrative History of the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth 
Circuit, 60 DENY. L.J. 119, 124-28 (1983). 
15. See COMMISSION ON STRUCTURAL ALTERNATIVES FOR THE FEDERAL COURTS, H.R. 
REP. No. 26, 105th Cong., 1st Sess., at 1 (1997) [hereinafter HOUSE REPORT]. 
16. See id. 
17. See, e.g., 4TH CIR. R. 34(d) (imposing time limits on oral arguments); 9TH CIR. R. 36 
(limiting publication of dispositions to orders); Arthur D. Hellman, Central Staff in Appellate 
Courts: The Experience of the Ninth Circuit, 68 CAL. L. REV. 937, 938-41 (1980) (describing 
the use of support staff); see also Carl Tobias, The New Certiorari and a National Study of the 
Appeals Courts, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 1264, 1268 (1996) (analyzing regional circuits' responses). 
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Concerns about these dockets, which numerous federal judges voiced 
led Congress to create the Hruska Commission in 1972.18 After the 
entity conducted a comprehensive assessment of the appellate courts, it 
recommended that Congress divide the two largest circuits, the Fifth and 
the Ninth, rather than advocating a more thoroughgoing remedy, such 
as realignment of all of the appeals courts' boundaries.19 The Commis-
sion expressed reluctance to disrupt institutions that had secured the 
loyalty and respect of their constituents and to disturb the sense of 
community apparently enjoyed by judges and lawyers within the existing 
appeals courts.20 
The Hruska Commission premised its suggestion that Congress split 
the Fifth and Ninth Circuits on general standards relating to reconfigura-
tion.21 Congress created the Eleventh Circuit by removing Alabama, 
Florida, and Georgia from the Fifth Circuit and leaving the Canal Zone, 
Louisiana, Mississippi, and Texas in that court.22 Congress divided the 
Fifth Circuit because of its magnitude in terms of geography, population, 
dockets, and judgeships and because the active judges of the court 
agreed on bifurcation.23 The Commission's recommendation that 
Congress split California and reassign its district courts to different 
circuits was not foreseen and proved very controversial. The proposal 
delayed serious legislative examination of the Ninth Circuit's division 
at the time. 24 
Several extra-governmental agencies, such as the American Bar 
Association (ABA), undertook studies of the appellate courts after the 
Hruska Commission had completed its work.25 In 1988, Congress 
18. See HRUSKA COMMISSION, supra note 2, at 227; see also Act of Oct. 13, 1972, Pub. 
L. No. 92-489, 86 Stat. 807 (1973). The Judicial Conference Long Range Planning Committee 
needed four years to compile a long range plan, but it resembled the Hruska Commission more 
than the new study. 
19. See HRUSKA COMMISSION, supra note 2, at 228. 
20. See id. 
21. The standards provided that: (1) at least three states should constitute circuits; (2) 
appeals courts should not be established that would immediately require more than nine judges; 
(3) circuits ought to include states which have diverse populations, legal business and socio-
economic interests; (4) realignment should not unduly interfere with existing appellate court 
boundaries; and (5) appeals courts should consist of contiguous states. See id. at 231-32. 
22. Act of Oct. 14, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-452, § 2, 94 Stat. 1994 (current version at 28 
U.S.C. § 41 (1994)). See generally H.R. REP. No. 1390, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1980 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4236; Baker, supra note 6, at 925-28. 
23. See Baker, supra note 6, at 927. 
24. See HRUSKA COMMISSION, supra note 2, at 234-35. See generally Arthur D. Hellman, 
Legal Problems of Dividing a State Between Federal Judicial Circuits, 122 U. PA. L. REV. 1188 
(1974). 
25. See, e.g., Frank A. Kaufman et al., Report of the American Bar Association Standing 
Committee on Federal Judicial Improvements, The United States Courts of Appeals: 
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authorized the Federal Courts Study Committee, an independent entity 
comprised of distinguished members of Congress, judges and attorneys, 
to analyze the federal courts and afford recommendations for their 
improvement.26 The Committee found that the appeals courts were 
experiencing a "crisis of volume" that had transformed them over the 
preceding quarter-century.27 It predicted that "more fundamental 
change" appeared inevitable, barring reduced appellate workloads, a 
possibility that seemed remote.28 The Committee's report assessed five 
basic structural alternatives for treating docket growth.29 It endorsed 
none of them, but discussed the options to foster future inquiry and 
debate among the legislative, judicial and executive branches and 
attorneys.30 The Committee proposed that Congress authorize a five-
year evaluation of the appeals courts' caseloads and structural measures 
for responding to them. Senators and representatives, however, did not 
prescribe the recommended study.31 
The Federal Judicial Center (FJC) concluded a 1993 examination of 
structural mechanisms at the instigation of the Committee and Con-
gress.32 The Center ascertained that the appeals courts were experienc-
ing stress that structural modifications could not significantly relieve.33 
The Long Range Planning Committee of the Judicial Conference of the 
United States completed a relatively thorough assessment of the federal 
courts and issued a final report in December 1995.34 The Committee 
rather strongly opposed reconfiguring appeals courts: instead, it explored 
the prospects of assigning district court judges additional appellate 
responsibilities and decreasing the size of appeals court panels.35 
Reexamining Structure and Process After a Century of Growth, reprinted in 125 F.R.D. 523, 
542-44 (1989) [hereinafter ABA Report] (discussing the problem of intracircuit conflicts). See 
generally THOMAS E. BAKER, RATIONING JUSTICE ON APPEAL (1994). 
26. See REPORr OF THE FEDERAL COURI'S STUDY COMMITIEE (1990); see also Federal 
Courts Study Act, Pub. L. No. 100-702, §§ 101-103, 102 Stat. 4642, 4644 (1988). 
27. See REPORr OF THE FEDERAL COURI'S STUDY COMMITIEE, supra note 26, at 109. 
28. See id. 
29. See id. at 116-23. 
30. See id. 
31. See id. at 116. 
32. See JUDITH A. MCKENNA, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, STRUCIURAL AND OTHER 
ALTERNATIVES FOR THE FEDERAL COURI'S OF APPEALS (1993). 
33. See id. at 155. 
34. See JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, LoNG RANGE PLAN FOR THE 
FEDERAL COURI'S (1995) [hereinafter LoNG RANGE PLAN]. 
35. See id. at 43-45. 
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B. Ninth Circuit 
Recent activity in the Senate and the House of Representatives 
relating to proposals for bifurcating the Ninth Circuit deserve consider-
able discussion here, even though some dimensions of the relevant 
background have received treatment elsewhere.36 Applicable develop-
ments principally implicating the Ninth Circuit require exploration 
because they ultimately led to, and are inextricably intertwined with, 
congressional authorization of a national study commission. 
1. Earlier Proposals to Split the Ninth 
Circuit and Ameliorative Efforts 
Since before the Second World War, there have been a number of 
suggestions to bifurcate the Ninth Circuit.37 The Hruska Commission's 
recommendation that Congress divide the court was foreseeable, even 
though its proposal that California be split and that the state's district 
courts be reassigned to two appeals courts was not anticipated.38 The 
entity's suggestion to bifurcate California provoked much controversy 
and delayed contemporaneous legislative assessment of the court's 
division.39 Congress evinced little additional interest in a circuit-
splitting bill that senators introduced during 1983.40 
In 1978, Congress authorized appeals courts with more than fifteen 
active judges to restructure the courts by using administrative units and 
to prescribe streamlined processes for en bane proceedings.41 The Ninth 
Circuit responded to this legislative invitation in several innovative 
ways. For instance, the court reorganized into three units to secure more 
decentralized and efficient administration.42 The circuit also promulgat-
36. See supra note 6. 
37. See Baker, supra note 6, at 928; see also OFFICE OF THE CIRCUIT EXECUTIVE FOR THE 
UNITED STATES COUIITS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT, PosmoN PAPER 1N OPPOSmON TO S.1686 
NINTH CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS REORGANIZATION ACT (Aug. 2, 1991) [hereinafter s. 1686 
PosmoN PAPER] (affording additional historical background). 
38. See supra text accompanying note 24. 
39. See id. 
40. See S. 1156, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983); see also Baker, supra note 6, at 928; Faye 
A. Silas, Circuit Breaker-Move on to Split the Ninth, 10 ABA J. 34, 34 (1984). 
41. "Any court of appeals having more than 15 active judges may constitute itself into 
administrative units .•• and may perform its en bane function by such number of members of 
its en bane courts as may be prescribed by rule of the court of appeals." Act of Oct. 20, 1978, 
Pub. L. No. 95-486, § 6, 92 Stat. 1629, 1633, supplemented by Act of Oct. 15, 1980, Pub. L. 
No. 96-458, 94 Stat. 2035 (1981). 
42. See Baker, supra note 6, at 929. See generally JOE s. CECIL, ADMINISTRATION OF 
JUSTICE 1N A LARGE APPELLATE COURT: THE NINTH CIRCUIT INNOVATIONS PROJECT (1985); 
OFFICE OF THE CIRCUIT ExECUTIVE UNITED STATES COURTS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT, S. 948 
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ed a local rule providing for a limited en bane procedure, whereby the 
chief judge and ten active judges who are randomly chosen sit en bane 
to rehear cases on a majority vote of all active judges.43 
The court's judges have enhanced their productivity, and the circuit 
has effectuated a number of internal reforms. For example, prebriefing 
conferences narrow issues on appeal, restrict the size of briefs, and 
explore settlement prospects.44 Circuit staff have become more effi-
cient, and the court relies substantially on technological innovations.45 
In 1989, the circuit reported to Congress that the instituted reforms had 
enabled the court to resolve the system's largest docket efficaciously, 
that there was no reason to bifurcate the circuit, and that the measures 
employed even allowed the court to accommodate additional growth.46 
2. The 1990 Effort 
Before 1995, Senate Bill 948 represented the "most credible effort" 
to split the Ninth Circuit.47 Eight senators from states that the proposed 
division would have affected co-sponsored the bill,48 and the United 
States Department of Justice endorsed the measure.49 During March 
NINTH CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS REORGANIZATION ACT 6-7 (1989) [hereinafter s. 948 
PosmON PAPER]. 
43. 9rn CIR. R. 35-3 (formerly Rule 25). See generally ABA Report, supra note 25, at 
542-44 (intracircuit conflict is not alleviated by en bane decisions); PAUL D. CARRINGTON ET 
AL., JUSTICE ON APPEAL 161-63, 200-03 (1976) (asserting that the efficiency of en bane review 
declines as the number of judges increases); Steven Bennett & Christine Pembroke, "Mini" In 
Banc Proceedings: A Survey of Circuit Practices, 34 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 531 (1986). 
44. See Baker, supra note 6, at 932; John B. Oakley, The Screening of Appeals: The Ninth 
Circuit's Experience in the Eighties and Innovations for the Nineties, 1991 B.Y.U. L. REV. 859, 
861, 875-903 (describing the Ninth Circuit's model for screening cases during a six and a half 
year "study period"); see also CECIL, supra note 42, at 79-95 (explaining the Ninth Circuit's 
prebriefing conference program); S. 948 PosmoN PAPER, supra note 42, at 6-7. 
45. See Baker, supra note 6, at 932; Cathy Catterson, The Changing Ninth Circuit, 21 
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 173, 174-76 (1989) (reviewing the new computer programs used in the Ninth 
Circuit); Hellman, supra note 17, at 940 (describing the Ninth Circuit's support staff); see also 
OFFICE OF THE CIRCUIT ExECUTIVE OF IBE U.S. COURTS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT, PosmoN 
PAPER IN 0PPOSmON TO S. 956--NINTH CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS REORGANIZATION ACT 
OF 1995 (June 22, 1995), reprinted in 141 CONG. REC. S10436 (daily ed. July 10, 1995) 
[hereinafter S. 956 PosmoN PAPER] (lauding court's experimentation). 
46. THE JUDICIAL COUNCIL AND UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINIB 
CIRCUIT, FOURTH BIENNIAL REPORT TO CONGRESS ON IBE IMPLEMENTATION OF SECTION 6 OF 
THE OMNIBUS JUDGESHIPS ACT OF 1978 AND 0rnER MEASURES TO IMPROVE IBE ADMINISTRA-
TION OF JUSTICE IN THE NINTH CIRCUIT 1 (July 1989); see also s. 956 PosmoN PAPER, supra 
note 45, at 3-4 (finding court's experimentation has led others to follow its lead). 
47. See Baker, supra note 6, at 932-33. 
48. See 135 CONG. REC. S5027 (daily ed. May 9, 1989). 
49. See Letter from Bruce C. Navarro, Acting Assistant Attorney General, U.S. Dep't of 
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1990, the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Courts and Administrative 
Practice held a hearing at which many advocates and opponents of 
circuit-splitting submitted much valuable information.50 
At the 1989 meeting of the Ninth Circuit Judicial Conference, the 
entity adopted the official position that Congress should reject recom-
mendations to divide the circuit, and ·most of the court's active judges 
opposed bifurcation.st Proponents of the bill seemingly did not con-
vince Congress to restructure the court, and critics of S. 948 apparently 
responded in a persuasive manner to the contentions of the bill's 
advocates.s2 The Judiciary Committee ultimately refused to approve the 
measure.s3 The most significant reasons favoring and opposing S. 948 
warrant little treatment here as they differ minimally from the rationales 
that advocates have articulated since 1995.54 
3. Activities of the 104th Congress 
a. Circuit-Splitting Bills 
In late May 1995, senators from Pacific Northwest states introduced 
a bill that would have split the Ninth Circuit.ss This measure's intro-
duction constituted the fourth effort to divide the appeals court in the 
last thirteen years.56 The proposal would have included Alaska, Idaho, 
Montana, Oregon, and Washington in a new Twelfth Circuit and would 
have placed Arizona, California, Hawaii, Nevada, Guam, and the 
Northern Mariana Islands in the Ninth Circuit.s7 The proposed Twelfth 
Circuit would have been assigned nine active judges and the new Ninth 
Circuit would have had nineteen active members; Senate Bill 956 
authorized no new judgeships.ss 
Justice, to Sen. Howell Heflin, Chairman, Subcomm. on Courts and Admin. Practice 5 (Mar. 6, 
1990), reprinted in Hearing on S. 948 Before the Subcomm. on Courts and Admin. Practice of 
the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, lOlst Cong., 2d Sess. 571, 571 (1990) [hereinafter S. 948 
Hearing]. 
50. See generally S. 948 Hearing, supra note 49. 
51. See S. 1686 PosmoN PAPER, supra note 37, at 2. See generally S. 956 PosmoN 
PAPER, supra note 45,.at 3. 
52. See, e.g., S. 948 Hearing, supra note 49; Baker, supra note 6, at 934. 
53. See S. 956 PosmoN PAPER, supra note 45, at 3; S. 1686 PosmON PAPER, supra note 
37, at 2. 
54. See infra text accompanying notes 55-80. 
55. See S. 956, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995); see also S.853, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. 
(1995) (providing earlier similar bill). 
56. See Tobias, supra note 7, at 1363-66; S. 956 PosmoN PAPER, supra note 45, at 2, 3. 
57. See S. 956 § 2. See generally Baker, supra note 6, at 928-45; Tobias, supra note 7, 
at 1363-75. 
58. See S. 956 §§ 2, 5. 
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During September of 1995, the Senate Judiciary Committee held a 
hearing on S. 956, and the Committee received much cogent testimony 
and considerable additional information from champions and critics of 
circuit-division.59 In a December Committee markup session, the 
Judiciary Committee approved an amendment in the proposal as 
introduced. The amendment would have left California, Hawaii, Guam 
and the Northern Mariana Islands in the Ninth Circuit with fifteen 
judges and would have placed Alaska, Arizona, Idaho, Montana, 
Nevada, Oregon and Washington, the remaining states of the existing 
Ninth Circuit, in a new Twelfth Circuit with thirteen judges.6<> 
The Senate and Committee members received and assessed numerous 
well-considered ideas that favored and opposed splitting the Ninth 
Circuit. Division's advocates stressed the problems which the circuit's 
mammoth size has purportedly created.61 These encompassed the 
court's gigantic geographic magnitude, the circuit's significant number 
of judges (twenty-eight), the court's massive caseload, and the substan-
tial expenses of operating the circuit. 62 
Opponents of the court's division countered the above arguments in 
several ways. They claimed that the circuit has instituted reforms which 
treat complications ascribed to size.63 For instance, over a decade ago, 
the court established administrative units in Pasadena and Seattle where 
appeals can be filed and orally argued, and the change has proved 
responsive to the distances that counsel and litigants must travel.64 
Creation of the projected Twelfth Circuit would not have modified this 
circumstance for many attorneys who now practice in the proposed 
circuit. Critics also suggested that the court's magnitude affords benefits. 
For example, it offers economies of scale, while large size provides 
considerable diversity in terms of the complexity and novelty of cases 
and in terms of judges' gender, race, political views and geographic 
origins.65 
59. See The Ninth Circuit Split: Hearing on S. 853 and S. 956 Before the Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. 69 (1995) [hereinafter S. 956 Hearings]. 
60. See Senate Judiciary Committee Markup of S. 956, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (Dec. 8, 
1995) [hereinafter S. 956 Markup]; see also SENATE REPORT, supra note 6, at 2. 
61. See S. 956 Markup, supra note 60, at 12-13. 
62. See, e.g., 141 CONG. REC. S7504, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (daily ed. May 25, 1995) 
(statement of Sen. Slade Gorton) [hereinafter Gorton Statement]; id. at S7505-06 (statement of 
Sen. Conrad Bums) [hereinafter Bums Statement]. 
63. See supra notes 41-43 and accompanying text. 
64. See Baker, supra note 6, at 929. See generally CECIL, supra note 42. 
65. See, e.g., S. 956 PosmoN PAPER, supra note 45; Steve Albert, Congress Weighs Plan 
to Divide the 9th Circuit, LEGAL TlMES, Feb. 1, 1993, at 12, 13 (quoting former Chief Judge 
James Browning's assertion that court's diversity is an asset). 
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Another important contention of circuit-splitting's proponents was 
that Ninth Circuit case law is inconsistent. The statistical possibilities for 
conflicting opinions on a twenty-eight judge court seem significant 
because 3276 combinations of three-judge panels could resolve an 
issue.66 The Ninth Circuit Executive Office and experts who have 
analyzed the circuit have found insufficient inconsistency to warrant 
concern.67 The court has instituted measures to reduce conflicts. For 
example, the circuit's staff attorneys fully review every appeal and code 
into a computer the issues for resolution. 68 The court then assigns to 
the same three-judge panel those cases which raise similar issues and are 
ready for resolution at the same time.69 
Another major argument of S. 956's advocates was that the court's 
California judges, perspectives, and appeals have dominated the Pacific 
Northwest.70 This contention partly reflected the champions' dissatis-
faction with Ninth Circuit decisions in fields such as environmental law 
and the death penalty.71 Some opponents of circuit-splitting responded 
by maintaining that the preferable way to effect substantive changes in 
the law is to convince Congress to alter it.72 Critics also challenged the 
proponents' underlying premise that judges who were located in 
California were monolithic and idiosyncratic.73 Assessment of the 
judges' viewpoints and the computerized, random selection of three-
judge panels rendered untenable any effort to stereotype the circuit's 
California judges.74 Finally, critics observed that a majority of the 
court's active judges were not even stationed in California.75 
There are certain additional ideas that champions and critics 
enunciated in support of and against the Ninth Circuit's division. 
Opponents emphasized that the proposed Ninth Circuit would have had 
66. See Baker, supra note 6, at 938. 
67. See S. 956 PosmoN PAPER, supra note 45, at 4-5; see also infra text accompanying 
notes 199-200. See generally Arthur D. Hellman, Jumboism and Jurisprudence: The Theory and 
Practice of Precedent in the Large Appellate Court, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 541 (1989) (reviewing 
study of published opinions of the Ninth Circuit to determine if inconsistent decisions are a 
problem). 
68. See Hellman, supra note 17, at 944-45; see also UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT GENERAL ORDER 4.1 (1987). 
69. See Hellman, supra note 17, at 957-58. 
70. See, e.g., Gorton Statement, supra note 62, at S7504. 
71. See, e.g., Burns Statement, supra note 62, at S7505; S. 948 Hearing, supra note 49, 
at 284 (statement of Gov. Pete Wilson). 
72. See, e.g., Daniel Trigoboff, Northwest Favors Splitting 'California' Circuit, LEGAL 
TIMEs, June 12, 1989, at 15 (quoting former Chief Judge Alfred Goodwin). 
73. See Baker, supra note 6, at 940-41; Tobias, supra note 7, at 1372-73. 
74. See Baker, supra note 6, at 941-42. 
75. See Tobias, supra note 7, at 68. 
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a significantly less beneficial ratio of three-judge panels to appeals than 
the new Twelfth Circuit and a considerably less advantageous ratio than 
the current Ninth Circuit.76 Projections indicated that panels of the 
proposed Ninth Circuit would have annually faced 1014 appeals and 
panels of the proposed Twelfth Circuit would have annually confronted 
645 appeals, while panels of the existing Ninth Circuit address 868 
appeals.77 Critics also argued that the proposed Twelfth Circuit would 
have imposed much new administrative expense and would have 
replicated functions that the Ninth Circuit now discharges satisfactori-
ly. 78 Moreover, opponents claimed that most active members of the 
court and many attorneys who practice before it opposed bifurcation.79 
Proponents of circuit-splitting urged that judges on a smaller court, 
such as the proposed Twelfth Circuit-which would have had nine 
judges-would be more collegial, thereby enhancing efficiency. This 
proposition had some validity; however, additional evidence suggested 
that familiarity could have led to disadvantageous routinization, and in 
certain situations might have fostered disagreement.80 The circuit's 
small size may concomitantly have sacrificed the benefits of diversity 
and economies of scale that a bigger court offers. 
On March 18, 1996, a few advocates of S. 956 attempted to have the 
Senate consider the circuit-splitting measure as an amendment to federal 
courts appropriations legislation.81 Critics of the bill sharply attacked 
this effort on procedural grounds; however, senators participated in 
much substantive debate over the ~ourt's division.82 Proponents and 
opponents ultimately agreed on a study commission proposal which 
received strong bi-partisan support, and the Senate approved a commis-
sion on March 20.83 Upon receipt of the Senate measure, the House 
76. See S. 956 PosmoN PAPER, supra note 45, at 6. 
77. See id. at 5-6 (based on filings in 1994); see also OFFICE OF THE CIRCUIT ExECUTIVE 
FOR THE U.S. COURfS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT, PosmoN PAPER IN OPPOSmON TO s. 
956-NINTH CIRCUIT COURf OF APPEALS REORGANIZATION ACT OF 1995 (1217/95) AND 
COMPANION BILL H.R. 2935 (211196) 3 [hereinafter SECOND s. 956 PosmoN PAPER]. 
78. See S. 956 PosmoN PAPER, supra note 45, at 2-3. 
79. See SECONDS. 956 PosmoN PAPER, supra note 77, at 5; SENATE REPORf, supra note 
6, at 20-21; Tobias, supra note 7, at 1371. 
80. See Carl Tobias, The D.C. Circuit as a National Court, 48 U. MIAMI L. REV. 159, 
169-70 (1993) (describing the "reduced collegiality of the D.C. Circuit"). See generally FRANK 
M. COFFIN, ON APPEAL 213-29 (1994). 
81. See 142 CONG. REC. S2219-2303, 104th Cong., 2d Sess. (daily ed. Mar. 18, 1996) 
(amendment no. 3530 proposed by Senator Burns). 
82. See id. 
83. See 142 CONG. REC. S2544, S2545 (daily ed. Mar. 21, 1996). The decision to leave 
the court intact was advisable. Division would have been a limited reform and could have 
precluded implementation of more effective solutions, such as realigning the existing regional 
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assigned the proposal to the Judiciary Subcommittee on Intellectual 
Property and Judicial Administration which Representative Carlos 
Moorhead (R-Cal.) chaired. However, the House took no additional 
action on the Senate proposal during the 104th Congress. Congress did 
appropriate $500,000 for the commission's work but failed to pass 
authorizing legislation. 84 
b. Commission Proposals 
i. The Senate Proposal 
The Senate proposal required that the commission "transmit its report 
to the President and the Congress no later than February 28, 1997" and 
that the Senate Judiciary Committee act within sixty days of the 
document's transmittal.85 This measure differed somewhat from an 
earlier study commission proposal providing a two-year period for the 
work's completion and requiring no Judiciary Committee action on the 
commission report, which Senator Dianne Feinstein (D-Cal.) had offered 
as an amendment and which the Judiciary Committee narrowly rejected 
during its December 7, 1995 markup.86 
The time period that the March 21, 1996 proposal provided for the 
commission to conclude its assessment may have been insufficient when 
the Senate approved it. An informative yardstick for evaluating this 
temporal consideration is the time which analogous study entities have 
required to finish similar projects. The Federal Courts Study Committee 
conducted the most recent analogous endeavor, and that entity took a 
year and a half to conclude its work. 87 Some federal courts observers 
found this time period inadequate and suggested that the temporal 
limitation might have prevented the Study Committee from assembling 
an even better report. 88 The Hruska Commission undertook another 
similar analysis, and this group completed its study of the appeals courts 
after eighteen months.89 
Comparison of the March 21, 1996 Senate proposal with these prior, 
analogous study commission efforts thus suggests that the measure 
circuits or creating a third tier of appellate courts or more judgeships. 
84. See 142 CONG. REC. Hl1644, H11859 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1996). 
85. See 142 CONG. REC. S2545 (daily ed. Mar. 20, 1996). 
86. See S. 956 Markup, supra note 60 (statement of Sen. Feinstein); see also SENATE 
REPORI', supra note 6, at 19-20. 
87. See supra note 26. 
88. See Tobias, supra note 7, at 1408; see also Telephone Interview with Arthur D. 
Hellman, Professor of Law, University of Pittsburgh (June 1, 1996). 
89. See supra note 18. 
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would have allotted too little time for the proposed commission to finish 
the finest possible study. Legislative inaction, therefore, was probably 
advisable. Congress should not have established a commission that 
lacked adequate time to collect the most accurate data and to formulate 
the best suggestions. 
Rather similar difficulties involving scope also seemed to accompany 
the proposed commission's mandated duties. The proposal provided that 
the entity's functions were to: 
(1) study the present division of the United States into the 
several judicial circuits; 
(2) study the structure and alignment of the Federal courts 
of appeals with particular reference to the Ninth Circuit; 
and 
(3) report to the President and the Congress its recommen-
dations for such changes in circuit boundaries or structure 
as may be appropriate for the expeditious and effective 
disposition of the caseload of the Federal Courts of Ap-
peals, consistent with fundamental concepts of fairness and 
due process.90 
The charge appeared overly narrow. For instance, the initial two 
mandates required the commission to assess the country's present 
division into several appeals courts and the structure and alignment of 
the federal circuits "with particular reference to the Ninth Circuit"91 but 
did not speak to increasing appeals, which are the major complication 
that the appellate courts currently face.92 The two strictures probably 
could have been interpreted, however, to include docket growth. 
The third command did specifically prescribe suggestions for 
improvement that would lead to "expeditious and effective disposition" 
of appeals.93 Nevertheless, those recommendations for alterations were 
limited to "such changes in circuit boundaries or structure as may be 
appropriate for" prompt and effective resolution.94 Confining commis-
sion consideration to structural alternatives may have been too narrow. 
There are many other ways of treating the problems attributable to 
mounting caseloads, which should not be described as structural. 
90. See 142 CONG. REC. S2544, 104th Cong., 2d Sess. (daily ed. Mar. 20, 1996). 
91. See id. Senator Feinstein's proposal was similar, but it did not include "with particular 
reference to the Ninth Circuit" See S. 956 Markup, supra note 60 (statement of Sen. Feinstein). 
However, any national analysis of the appeals courts might well have emphasized this circuit. 
92. See, e.g., REPOIIT OF THE FEDERAL COUIITS STUDY COMMITfEE, supra note 26, at 
109. 
93. See 142 CONG. REC. S2545, 104th Cong., 2d Sess. (daily ed. Mar. 20, 1996). 
94. See id. 
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Examples are increases in the number of judges authorized and 
streamlining measures, such as those implemented by the Ninth Circuit, 
which a number of appellate courts have instituted.95 Precluding 
commission consideration of non-structural options might have been 
unwise because it eliminated numerous apparently promising approach-
es. This circumstance was worsened because it was quite difficult to 
ascertain which measures would have seemed most efficacious, until the 
commission that was established had carefully assembled, assessed, and 
synthesized the maximum applicable information. 
ii. Additional Ninth Circuit-Specific Proposals 
During the debate over the advisability of dividing the Ninth Circuit 
and of passing S. 956, Governor Pete Wilson (R-Cal.) and Ninth Circuit 
Judge Diarmuid O'Scannlain offered separate proposals that would have 
created a commission to study the court. Governor Wilson raised the 
possibility in a letter he sent to Senator Orrin Hatch (R-Utah), Chair of 
the Senate Judiciary Committee, on the eve of the December 1995 
Committee markup.96 Judge O'Scannlain mentioned the prospect during 
his testimony in the September 1995 Judiciary Committee hearing.97 
Governor Wilson wrote Senator Hatch to register his fervent 
opposition to any division before the completion of an objective analysis 
of whether bifurcation would treat effectively concerns regarding the 
court's size.98 The governor observed that the assessment should 
emphasize those questions aired about the Ninth Circuit and ascertain 
whether the court should be split.99 By way of illustration, he stated 
that "reform of our habeas corpus procedures and reforms which curb 
frivolous inmate litigation may do more to address a growing caseload 
than splitting the circuit."100 Governor Wilson urged that "a study be 
commissioned to carefully examine the concerns raised about the Ninth 
Circuit and determine whether the concerns are legitimate and whether 
95. See, e.g., SENATE REPORT, supra note 6, at 27-28; Tobias, supra note 7, at 1363-64, 
1405-07; see also infra text accompanying notes 229-302. 
96. See Letter from Pete Wilson, Governor of California, to Senator Orrin Hatch, Chair, 
U.S. Senate Judiciary Comm. (Dec. 6, 1995) [hereinafter Wilson Letter]. 
97. See S. 956 Hearings, supra note 59, at 71 (statement of Ninth Circuit Judge Diarmuid 
O'Scannlain) reprinted in pertinent part in Diarmuid O'Scannlain, A Ninth Circuit Split ls 
Inevitable, But Not Imminent, 56 OHIO ST. L.J. 947, 947-50 (1995). 
98. Wilson Letter, supra note 96. 
99. Id. 
100. Id. Governor Wilson was prescient The 104th Congress passed the Anti-Terrorism and 
Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996). 
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a change in the circuit's boundaries is the best method of addressing 
them."101 
Judge O'Scannlain proposed that Congress "direct the [C]ircuit 
[J]udges of the [N]inth [C]ircuit to reflect over the next few years and 
then to recommend, as did the judges of the Fifth Circuit Court of 
Appeals in the 1980's, what the proper division of their circuit should 
be."102 He suggested that the Ninth Circuit judges' recommendation be 
based on an analysis of those factors that would best enable the court 
to fulfill its future goals.103 The judge urged that any Ninth Circuit 
reconfiguration ensure accountability to all individuals whom the court 
now serves.104 Judge O' Scannlain admonished champions of prompt 
bifurcation that there had been "no recent systematic evaluation of 
division of the [N]inth [C]ircuit ... since the Hruska Commission report 
in the 1970's."105 
4. Activities of the 105th Congress 
The ongoing controversy over the Ninth.Circuit's possible division 
led to the introduction of several legislative proposals for assessing the 
federal appellate courts early in the first session of the 105th Congress. 
When Congress convened during January 1997, Senators Dianne 
Feinstein (D-Cal.) and Harry Reid (D-Nev.) introduced a bill that would 
have authorized a national study of the appellate courts.106 Soon 
thereafter, and in apparent response, Senator Conrad Burns (R-Mont.) 
and Representative Rick Hill (R-Mont.) introduced identical study 
commission measures that differed somewhat from the bill introduced 
by Senators Feinstein and Reid. 107 During March, Representative 
Howard Coble (R-N.C.) and Representative Howard Berman (D-Cal.) 
101. Wilson Letter, supra note 96. 
102. See S. 956 Hearings, supra note 59, at 71 (statement of Judge O'Scannlain); see also 
Tobias, supra note 7, at 1361-62 (analyzing the Fifth Circuit). 
103. See S. 956 Hearings, supra note 59, at 71 (statement of Judge O'Scannlain). 
104. See id. 
105. Id.; see also supra text accompanying note 89 (mentioning the Hruska Commission). 
The geographic scope of the analyses that the governor and the judge proposed was narrow. An 
assessment that was confined to the Ninth Circuit would by definition have been incomplete. 
The major difficulties that most circuits and the appellate system now face involve increasing 
caseloads, and the problems are essentially systemic complications which will require systemic 
treatment. A study limited to the Ninth Circuit, therefore, necessarily would not address all of 
the difficulties being experienced and would yield only partial recommendations. 
106. See S. 248, 105th Cong., 1st Sess. (1997). The ideas in this paragraph and this 
subsection are premised on conversations with individuals who are knowledgeable about the 
developments that occurred. 
107. See S. 283, 105th Cong., 1st Sess. (1997); H.R. 639, 105th Cong., 1st Sess. (1997). 
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introduced a proposal in the House that resembled the Feinstein-Reid 
measure. The House subsequently modified the proposal somewhat.108 
In March, numerous senators who represented states in the Pacific 
Northwest sponsored another piece of proposed legislation that would 
have divided the Ninth Circuit.109 The measure would have bifurcated 
the court by placing Alaska, Arizona, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, Oregon, 
and Washington in a new Twelfth Circuit and by leaving California, 
Hawaii, Guam and the Northern Mariana Islands in the present Ninth 
Circuit. 
The Feinstein-Reid and Bums-Hill study bills, as introduced, were 
similar in some ways but differed in certain important respects. The 
Feinstein-Reid, Bums-Hill and Coble-Berman measures included the 
same or analogous provisions for reimbursement, personnel, the 
information which the commission can assemble, and congressional 
consideration of the entity's suggestions.110 The three proposals also 
made identical prescriptions for some commission functions: to "study 
the present division of the United States into the several judicial 
circuits" and to "study the structure and alignment of the Federal Court 
of Appeals system, with particular reference to the Ninth Circuit."111 
The second provision thus modified the approach that Senator Feinstein 
followed in the 104th Congress because the 1997 bills added the word 
"system," thereby clarifying and emphasizing the systemic nature of the 
analysis prescribed. 112 
The study proposals included a third function which differed. The 
Feinstein-Reid and Coble-Berman measures required that the commis-
sion "report . . . its recommendations for such changes in circuit 
boundaries or structure as may be appropriate for the expeditious and 
effective disposition of the caseload of the Federal Courts of Appeals, 
consistent with fundamental concepts of fairness and due process."113 
The Bums-Hill proposal required the commission to "report recommen-
dations to the President and Congress on appropriate changes in circuit 
boundaries or structure for the expeditious and effective disposition of 
108. See H.R. 908, 105th Cong., 1st Sess. (1997). 
109. See S. 431, 105th Cong., 1st Sess. (1997). 
110. Compare S. 248, §§ 3-5, 7 and H.R. 908, §§ 3-5, 7 with S. 283, §§ 3-5, 7 and H.R. 
639, §§ 3-5, 7. 
111. Compare S. 248, § l(b)(l)-(2) and H.R. 908, § l(b)(l)-(2) with S. 283, § l(b)(l)-(2) 
and H.R. 639, § 1(b)(l)-(2). 
112. Compare S. 248, § 1(b)(2); H.R. 908, § l(b)(2); S. 283, § l(b)(2) and H.R. 639, § 
l(b)(2) with S. 956, § l(b)(2). 
113. See S. 248, § l(b)(3); H.R. 908, § 1(b)(3). 
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the caseload of the Federal Courts of Appeal, consistent with fundamen-
tal concepts of fairness and due process."114 
The measures prescribed rather dissimilar commission membership. 
The Feinstein-Reid proposal called for twelve members and authorized 
the President, the Chief Justice, the Senate Majority and Minority 
Leaders, the House Speaker and the House Minority Leader to appoint 
two members each.115 The Coble-Berman bill provided for similar 
composition but permitted the President and the Chief Justice to appoint 
only one member apiece.116 The Bums-Hill measure included eight 
members and empowered the President and the Chief Justice to name 
one member each and the Senate Majority Leader and the House 
Speaker to appoint three apiece. 117 
The proposals also differed as to the time provided for completion 
of the evaluation. The Feinstein-Reid measure required the commission 
to report "[n]o later than 2 years following the date on which its seventh 
member is appointed."118 The Coble-Berman approach commanded the 
entity to report "no later than eighteen months following the date on 
which its sixth member is appointed."119 The Bums-Hill proposal 
mandated that the commission report "[n]o later than 1 year after the 
date of the enactment ... or June 30, 1998, whichever occurs first."120 
The approaches differed as well over the funding that Congress 
would appropriate for completion of the study commission's work. The 
Feinstein-Reid measure would have allocated $1,300,000121 and the 
Coble-Berman bill would have allotted $900,000,122 while the Bums-
Hill proposal would have authorized $500,000, which meant that no new 
funding would need to be provided because the 104th Congress had 
authorized this amount.123 
During March, the House Judiciary Subcommittee and Committee 
promptly approved the Coble-Berman bill, which was scheduled for a 
floor vote on March 18.124 However, members of the House, including 
Representative Hill and Representative Don Young (R-Alaska), from the 
114. See S. 283, § l(b)(3); H.R. 639, § l(b)(3). 
115. See S. 248, § 2(a). 
116. See H.R. 908, § 2(a). 
117. See S. 283, § 2(a); H.R. 639, § 2(a). 
118. See S. 248, § 6. 
119. See H.R. 908, § 6. 
120. See S. 283, § 6. 
121. See S. 248, § 8. 
122. See H.R. 908, § 8. 
123. See S. 283, § 8; see also supra text accompanying note 84. 
124. The ideas in this paragraph and the next and the rest of this subsection are premised 
on conversations with individuals who are knowledgeable about the developments that occurred. 
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Northwest prevented that vote because they differed with the Coble-
Berman approach and because a satisfactory compromise agreement on 
a commission measure could not be reached. 
Attention then focused on attempts to develop a compromise in the 
Senate. Meetings between staff for Senators Bums and Feinstein led to 
consensus in several areas as to which they had differed. They agreed 
that the commission would have ten members, that the appointments 
would be identical to those provided in the Feinstein-Reid measure, 
except that the President and the Chief Justice would name one 
individual each, and that the commission would have eighteen months 
to finish its work. 
On June 3, the House passed an amended version of H.R. 908 that 
reflected numerous compromises struck by members of Congress in both 
chambers.125 This proposal included the original Feinstein-Reid 
provision for the commission's third function and the Feinstein-Bums 
compromise on the entity's membership, provided that the commission 
would report eighteen months from the date of appointment of its sixth 
member, and authorized $900,000 for the commission's work.126 Upon 
transmittal to the Senate, H.R. 908 remained at the desk and awaited 
Senate action. · 
The legislative history that attended House approval of this bill is 
important because the measure essentially served as the basis for the 
national study commission that the House-Senate Conference Committee 
ultimately authorized. The House Committee Report accompanying H.R. 
908 has considerable significance for several reasons. Neither the 
Judiciary Committee nor the Subcommittee conducted any hearings on 
the bill. Moreover, floor debate on H.R. 908 can fairly be characterized 
as terse. The floor statements of the measure's foremost proponents, 
namely Representative Coble and Representative Henry Hyde (R-Ill.), 
chair of the Judiciary Committee, also appeared to be premised 
substantially on the House Committee Report. This report correspond-
ingly informs understanding of the statutory language that authorizes the 
study, especially the phrasing that is cryptic or unclear. Furthermore, the 
report was effectively the last, most comprehensive, specific, and 
authoritative pronouncement, while it illuminates the convoluted, lengthy 
legislative process that culminated in the commission's approval. 
The House Committee Report afforded numerous instructive insights 
regarding the commission and its responsibilities. Perhaps most 
important, the report amplified and clarified the duties that Congress 
anticipated for the entity and the developments that led to its creation. 
125. See 143 CONG. REC. H3223, H3225 (daily ed. June 3, 1997). 
126. See id. at H3223. 
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The House Committee Report stated that the "legislation originated as 
a response to recurring attempts to divide the largest of the federal 
judicial circuits, the Ninth," but admonished that the commission 
proposal "represents a sound approach to a problem of national concern: 
explosive growth in the caseload of all of the courts of appeals."127 
The report observed that appellate filings had grown by over 200 
percent and that the number of judgeships had increased, albeit much 
more slowly, since the mid-1970s, although the appellate system's 
structure has remained essentially unchanged from its 1891 establish-
ment.128 The Judiciary Committee declared that the "time is ripe for 
a careful, objective study aimed at determining whether that structure 
can adequately serve the needs of the 21st century" and that the 
commission's task would be to undertake the study.129 
The House Committee Report reiterated that the "immediate occasion 
for the Commission proposal was the debate over dividing the Ninth 
Circuit, [however,] the proposal has its origins in the work of the 
Federal Courts Study Committee, which was created by Act of Congress 
in 1988."130 The Study Committee's 1990 report 
concluded that the federal appellate courts were already 
experiencing a "crisis of volume" [and] ... expressed the 
view that "within as few as five years the nation could have 
to decide whether or not to abandon the present circuit 
structure in favor of an alternative structure that might 
better organize the more numerous a~J?ellate judges needed 
to grapple with a swollen caseload." 
The Committee had explored several " 'structural alternatives' " but 
endorsed none, calling for " 'further inquiry and discussion.' "132 
The House Committee Report stated that the new commission would 
"take up where the Federal Courts Study Committee left off [and] would 
be the first of its kind since the [Hruska Commission] which completed 
its work in 1975."133 The report found it obvious that 
dramatic changes have taken place in the work of the 
federal courts in those two decades, including the explosive 
127. See HOUSE REPOIIT, supra note 15, at 1. 
128. See id. 
129. See id. at 1-2. 
130. See id. at 2; see also supra text accompanying notes 26-31. 
131. See HOUSE REPOIIT, supra note 15, at 2. 
132. See id.; see also supra text accompanying notes 30-31. 
133. See HOUSE REPOIIT, supra note 15, at 2; see also supra text accompanying notes 18-
24, 26-31. 
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growth noted above. . . . [but that] there have been no 
structural alterations except for the division of the old Fifth 
Circuit and the creation of the Court of Appeals for the 
Federal Circuit. 134 
[\bl. 49 
During the June 3 floor debate, the principal advocates of the study 
commission made numerous statements similar to those included in the 
report and occasionally quoted verbatim from that document. Illustrative 
are the remarks of Representative Coble, chair of the subcommittee with 
responsibility for the bill: 
H.R. 908 was introduced in response to recurring attempts 
to divide the largest of the Federal judicial circuits, the 
[N]inth. 
However, if properly implemented, the commission 
proposal represents a sound approach to a problem of 
national concern, and that is the explosive growth in the 
caseload of all of the courts of appeals. 
The time is right, it seems to me, for a careful, objective 
study aimed at determining whether that structure can 
adequately serve the needs of the 21st century. The task of 
the commission would be to carry out that study.135 
Representative Coble added for emphasis that the entity was "not to be 
exclusively restricted to the [N]inth [C]ircuit [but] hopefully, will 
examine the entire system and come back with a recommendation that 
the commission deems appropriate," even as he observed that the "study 
is a responsible method to evaluate any prospective split in the [N]inth 
[C]ircuit and is generally overdue."136 
134. See HOUSE REPOKI', supra note 15, at 2; see also supra text accompanying notes 12, 
21-23. 
135. See 143 CONG. REC. H3223 (daily ed. June 3, 1997). He then offered comments nearly 
identical to those in the Report: 
The proposed commission would be the first of its kind since the Commission on 
Revision of the Federal Court Appellate System, also known as the Hruska 
Commission, which completed its work in 1975, or more than two decades ago. 
Needless to say, dramatic changes have taken place in the work of the Federal 
courts in those two decades, but there have been no structural alterations except for 
the division of the old [F]ifth [C]ircuit and the creation of the Court of Appeals for 
the Federal Circuit. 
Id.; see also supra notes 132-33 and accompanying text. 
136. See 143 CONG. REC. H3224 (daily ed. June 3, 1997). 
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Representative Hyde, the House Judiciary Committee chair, echoed 
numerous propositions which appeared in the House Committee Report 
and a number of ideas that Representative Coble propounded. Perhaps 
most important, Representative Hyde reiterated that the "goal of the 
commission will be to study the entire Federal appellate court system, 
but, of course, with a particular view toward addressing the problems 
facing the largest and most diverse circuit we have, the [N]inth."137 He 
characterized the study envisioned as a "responsible method to evaluate 
the structure of the Federal appellate courts and make recommendations 
that can provide a sound foundation for congressional action in the 
future," even while recognizing that "[p]roblems do exist in the size and 
makeup of the [N]inth [C]ircuit," which the commission would equitably 
analyze.138 
The Judiciary Committee chair repeated and elaborated the notions 
relating to the commission's origins and purposes that were expressed 
in the report and in Representative Coble's floor statement. For instance, 
Representative Hyde reaffirmed that the entity would "take up where the 
Federal Court Study Committee left off' and recounted several of this 
committee's most important findings, such as its conclusion that the 
appellate courts were experiencing a "crisis of volume."139 
Representative Zoe Lofgren (D-Cal.), a minority member of the 
Judiciary Committee, reaffirmed some of the above ideas, especially 
regarding the crisis of volume and the commission's purposes, and 
expanded on certain propositions.140 Most significantly, she acknowl-
edged that the study's initial impetus were proposals to "split the 
[N]inth [C]ircuit."141 Representative Lofgren emphasized, however, that 
the "proposed commission actually has a broader mandate . . . than 
studying the [N]inth [C]ircuit. In fact, as we enter the twenty-first 
century, we need to take a look at the entire range of possibilities."142 
She admitted that the entity could certainly make a suggestion "to split 
one of the circuits, to reconfigure the circuits and then Congress could 
follow the Commission's recommendation or be free to choose another 
alternative."143 
137. See id. 
138. See id. 
139. See id. He found that the study "could not be more timely,'' reciting data reflecting 
that "in fiscal 1996, the number of appeals filed in the 12 regional courts of appeals rose 4 
percent to 51,991 [which was] an all-time high in filings, with eight circuits reporting increases." 
Id. 
140. See id. 
141. Id. 
142. Id. 
143. Id. She added, ''Whatever we intend to do, I know that we will be better off with the 
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In mid-July, Senators from the Pacific Northwest, including Senator 
Ted Stevens (R-Alaska), Senator Slade Gorton (R-Wash.) and Senator 
Burns, who are members of the Appropriations Committee, persuaded 
the committee to approve an appropriations rider that would have 
divided the Ninth Circuit. 144 On July 29, the full Senate adopted this 
appropriations rider. The proposal would have left California, Nevada, 
Guam, and the Northern Mariana Islands in that court.14s The measure 
would have created a new Twelfth Circuit that encompassed Alaska, 
Arizona, Hawaii, Idaho, Montana, Oregon, and Washington. 146 The 
rider authorized fifteen judges for the Ninth Circuit and thirteen judges 
for the Twelfth Circuit. 147 The proposal afforded the Twelfth Circuit 
two co-equal seats and two co-equal court clerks located in Phoenix and 
in Seattle. 148 
Republican senators-principally from the West-voiced many 
arguments, few of which were new, in favor of the Senate action during 
floor debate. For example, they contended that the Ninth Circuit's size 
in terms of population, geography, caseload, and judges creates 
problems.149 The court's geographic magnitude was said to impose 
travel expenses on attorneys and litigants, while its caseload creates 
delay and inconsistency in the court's decisionmaking.1so Numerous 
Senate members also suggested that the rate at which the Supreme Court 
reverses the Ninth Circuit shows that the court is out of touch.151 They 
claimed that projected population growth in the region will exacerbate 
these difficulties. 152 
Some circuit-splitting opponents argued that there is too much 
uncertainty about the precise nature of the problems facing the Ninth 
Circuit and other appellate courts and the most effective solutions for 
those difficulties to implement the dramatic step of dividing the Ninth 
Circuit today.1s3 Many important questions involving this court and the 
other regional circuits are ones about which there is insufficient 
expert advice that this commission will provide to us. It is always better to have good, 
thoughtful, expert advice than to simply move forward, especially in dealing with the judiciary." 
Id. 
144. See S. 1022, § 305(b)(2), 105th Cong., 1st Sess. (1997). 
145. Id.§ 305; 143 CONG. REC. 8041 et seq. (daily ed. July 24, 1997). 
146. s. 1022, § 305(b)(3). 
147. Id. § 305(c)(l)-(2). 
148. Id. § 305(d)(l)-(2). 
149. See 143 CONG. REC. S8041, S8044 (daily ed. July 24, 1997) (statements of Sen. 
Gorton). 
150. See id. at S8046 (statements of Sen. Hatch). 
151. See id. at S8044, S8048 (statements of Sen. Gorton and Sen. Burns). 
152. See id. at S8045 (statement of Sen. Gorton). 
153. See id. at S8046-47 (statement of Sen. Hatch). 
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information. For example, the circuit-splitting proponents have argued 
that the Ninth Circuit decides cases too slowly because of its size.154 
However, no data correlate size with time to resolution. Indeed, 
vacancies in ten of the court's twenty-eight authorized judgeships and 
the Senate's confirmation of no judge for the court since January 
1996155 better explain the time required to treat appeals. 
The proposal to split the Ninth Circuit also posed very real pragmatic 
problems. It would have been an administrative nightmare to establish 
a new court, especially one with two co-clerks and co-equal headquar-
ters, by October 1. One problem, for example, was that the existing 
courthouses in Phoenix and Seattle were not constructed to accommo-
date circuit headquarters. 156 The statute that divided the old Fifth 
Circuit correspondingly took effect one year after passage, and the court 
only ceased to exist some three years later. Moreover, the division 
suggested improperly allocated the caseload. For instance, judges of the 
new Twelfth Circuit would have had to resolve 239 appeals annually, 
while judges of the proposed Ninth Circuit would have had to decide 
363 cases annually-which would have been fifty percent more.157 
During floor debate, senators defeated 55-45 along political party lines 
an amendment that would have authorized a study similar to the one that 
the House had approved. 158 
The Senate appropriations rider provoked strong opposition from 
Representative Hyde, chair of the House Judiciary Committee, Represen-
tative Coble, chair of the House Judiciary Subcommittee on Courts and 
Intellectual Property, and members of the House who represent 
California. 159 These members of Congress enunciated numerous 
reasons for their opposition. For example, the critics evinced concern 
that the bifurcation envisioned would improperly distribute the caseload 
between the two proposed courts and that the Senate was using the 
appropriations process to make an important substantive determina-
tion. 160 They also suggested that dividing the Ninth Circuit would have 
been too dramatic an action to institute without clear comprehension of 
154. See id. at S8046 (statement of Sen. Hatch). 
155. See id. at S8045 (statement of Sen. Leahy). 
156. See id. at S8043 (statement of Sen. Feinstein). 
157. See id. at S8056 (statement of Sen. Feinstein). 
158. See id. at S8061 (a rollcall vote, no. 204, was taken). 
159. See, e.g., Letter from Henry J. Hyde, Chair, House Judiciary Committee, to Robert 
Livingston, Chair, House Committee on Appropriations (Sept 5, 1997); Letter from Jerry Lewis 
et al., Members of Congress from California, to Harold Rogers, Chair, Appropriations Subcomm. 
on Commerce, Justice, State and the Judiciary (Oct. 17, 1997). I also rely in this paragraph on 
conversations with individuals who are knowledgeable about the developments that occurred. 
160. See 143 CONG. REC. at S8042 (statement of Sen. Feinstein). 
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the exact difficulties that the court and the appellate system are 
experiencing, what impacts those complications are having, and the most 
effective means of addressing the difficulties.161 
In mid-November, the House-Senate Conference Committee on 
Commerce-Justice-State Appropriations rejected the appropriations rider 
that would have divided the Ninth Circuit.162 The Conference Commit-
tee substituted a national study that incorporated numerous aspects of 
the proposals which both Houses had considered and that essentially 
embodied much included in H.R. 908.163 The compromise measure 
provides for five commission members, all of whom the Chief Justice 
of the United States was to appoint within thirty days, accords the entity 
ten months to study and two months to prepare a report and recommen-
dations, and adopts verbatim H.R. 908's charge. On December 19, Chief 
Justice Rehnquist appointed retired Supreme Court Justice Byron White, 
United States Court of Appeals Judges Gilbert Merritt of the Sixth 
Circuit and Pamela Rymer of the Ninth Circuit, United States District 
Judge William Browning of Arizona and N. Lee Cooper, the immediate-
ly past president of the American Bar Association (ABA).164 
In sum, the November 1997 statutory provision that authorizes a 
national commission to examine the federal appeals courts leaves 
unclear, overly general or unresolved several important features of that 
analysis while affording the entity a relatively short period to complete 
its work. The second Part of this Article, therefore, attempts to clarify 
those dimensions of the evaluation which remain ambiguous or which 
Congress did not specify or resolve and offers suggestions that should 
enable the commission to use its brief time most effectively. 
II. SUGGESTIONS FOR THE FuTuRE 
A. Suggestions for Resolving Unclear 
Aspects of the Study 
The legislation that approved the national assessment leaves unclear, 
overly general, or unresolved certain aspects of that analysis. The most 
significant features which require clarification, specification or resolution 
implicate the functions that the commission is to perform. The second 
part of the entity's charge that appears ambiguous states that it is to 
"study the structure and alignment of the Federal Court of Appeals 
161. See id. 
162. See H.R. 2267, § 305, 105th Cong., 1st Sess. (1997). 
163. See id.; see also supra text accompanying note 135. 
164. See Bill Kisliuk, White, Rymer to Consider Circuit Split, THE RECORDER, Dec. 22, 
1997, at 1; Members Named to Commission, THE THIRD BRANCH, Feb. 1998, at 1. 
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system, with particular reference to the Ninth Circuit."165 Perhaps least 
clear is exactly how much emphasis the commission should accord the 
Ninth Circuit in conducting the evaluation. 
The above examination of the authorizing language and the legisla-
tive history that accompanied the measure's passage suggests that the 
Ninth Circuit will receive special consideration.166 The statutory phrase 
"with particular reference to the Ninth Circuit" and the applicable 
legislative history-such as ideas in the House Committee Report, 
namely that the study proposal was introduced in "response to recurring 
attempts to divide the largest of the Federal judicial circuits, the 
[N]inth,"167 and the pronouncements of the assessment's principal 
proponents168-show that the commission must specifically scrutinize 
this court. 
My earlier discussion indicates that Congress also meant for the 
remaining regional circuits and the appellate system to receive consider-
able analysis. 169 The statutory wording of the instruction to "study the 
structure and alignment of the Federal Court of Appeals system"110 and 
the declarations of the evaluation's major advocates support this 
view.171 Most importantly, prior iterations used the term "federal courts 
of appeal"; therefore, addition of the word "system" signifies legislative 
intent that the assessment include all twelve regional circuits.172 
Champions of the endeavor concomitantly proclaimed that the 
commission's goal would be to analyze the "entire Federal appellate 
court system."173 These proponents and the House Committee Report 
apparently anticipated that the commission would examine the system's 
dozen units when they expressly stated that it would "take up where the 
Federal Courts Study Committee left off' because this entity had 
considered every circuit. 174 The advocates and the report correspond-
ingly characterized the commission as a "sound approach to a problem 
of national concern: explosive growth in the caseload of all of the courts 
of appeals."175 The commission's champions additionally observed that 
the study group "would be the first of its kind since the" Hruska 
165. See H.R. 908, § l(b)(2), 105th Cong., 1st Sess. (1997). 
166. See supra text accompanying notes 111-12, 127, 130, 135-38, 141-43. 
167. H.R. 908, § l(b)(2); HOUSE REPoIIT, supra note 15, at 1. 
168. See supra text accompanying notes 111-12, 127, 130, 135-38, 141-43. 
169. See id. 
170. See H.R. 908, § l(b)(2) (emphasis added). 
171. See supra text accompanying notes 111-12, 127, 130, 135-38, 141-43. 
172. See supra text accompanying note 112. 
173. See supra text accompanying notes 136-37. 
174. See supra text accompanying notes 133, 139. 
175. See HOUSE REPOIIT, supra note 15, at 1. 
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Commission, an entity that explored the whole system even while 
concentrating on the Fifth and Ninth Circuits.176 
The above information, accordingly, suggests that the commission 
ought to evaluate the Ninth Circuit, the remaining regional appeals 
courts, and the appellate system. The entity should focus on the Ninth 
Circuit but must not assess this court to the exclusion of the other 
regional circuits or the system. Congress, thus, seemed to afford the 
commission considerable latitude in deciding precisely how much to 
emphasize the Ninth Circuit. 
The commission could exercise this discretion in several ways to 
maximize the advantages it can derive from the effort. For example, the 
entity may want to employ the Ninth Circuit as a surrogate for certain 
appeals courts that are similarly situated in terms of parameters-such 
as the problems that they experience, the courts' judicial complements, 
their caseloads' magnitude, the populations which the circuits serve, the 
time that the courts require to resolve appeals, and potential solutions to 
the difficulties being encountered. Illustrative might be the Fifth and 
Eleventh Circuits, which have memberships, dockets and disposition 
times, and use remedial measures that resemble those employed within 
the Ninth Circuit. Analysis and comparison of the three courts could 
yield instructive insights relating specifically to large circuits' opera-
tion.177 
The commission might concomitantly attempt to evaluate as a group 
other appeals courts that seem analogous or share certain characteristics, 
perhaps deploying one as a template. Exemplary are the Eighth and 
Tenth Circuits, which encompass comparatively large land masses but 
are rather sparsely populated, and the Second, Third and Seventh 
Circuits, which include relatively few states, serve substantial numbers 
of people, and have somewhat similar caseloads that they treat in 
numerous comparable ways. 
The initial two components of the commission's charge require it to 
"study the present division of the United States into the several judicial 
circuits [and] study the structure and alignment of the Federal Court of 
Appeals system."178 The entity could narrowly read these instructions 
to preclude consideration of the burgeoning caseloads and the resource 
limitations that are the principal problems presently confronted by the 
176. See supra text accompanying notes 133, 135; see also supra text accompanying notes 
18-24, 38-39. 
177. Analysis specifically could determine whether the size of the three large courts 
undermines collegiality or correlates with speed of resolution. 
178. See H.R. 908, § l(b)(l)-(2). 
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appellate courts.179 However, the third part of the commission's 
mandate expressly prescribes suggestions which would foster the 
appeals' "expeditious and effective disposition."180 Moreover, much in 
the relevant legislative history clearly provides that mounting dockets 
are to be the study's central focus. For instance, the House Committee 
Report characterizes the commission as a "sound approach to a problem 
of national concern: explosive growth in the caseload of all of the courts 
of appeals,"181 while several of the assessment's proponents espoused 
similar sentiments. 182 
The third constituent of the entity's instructions commands it to 
report "recommendations for such changes in circuit boundaries or 
structure as may be appropriate for the expeditious and effective 
disposition of the [appellate caseload] consistent with fundamental 
concepts of fairness and due process."183 This language seemingly 
envisions that the commission will only forward suggestions for 
modifications in appeals courts' boundaries or structure which comport 
with essential tenets of equity and due process, while considerable, 
relevant legislative history speaks in terms of circuit structure and 
structural remedies. 
The statutory phraseology employed and some legislative history, 
however, could be construed to encompass solutions other than 
structural ones. The legislation's words can fairly be interpreted as 
empowering the commission to explore and recommend non-structural 
approaches, if it finds that "changes in circuit boundaries or structure 
[would not be] appropriate for the expeditious and effective disposi-
tion . . . of appeals, [or would not be] consistent with fundamental 
concepts of fairness and due process."184 For example, the Ninth 
Circuit split that the 1997 Senate appropriations rider required would 
have assigned judges of the proposed Ninth Circuit fifty percent more 
cases annually than judges of the new Twelfth Circuit, so that the 
structural modification contemplated for the projected Ninth Circuit 
might have failed to facilitate appeals' prompt or efficacious resolution 
or to honor basic principles of equity and due process.185 Should the 
commission determine that alterations in appellate court boundaries or 
structure would not foster expeditious or effective appellate disposition 
179. See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 15-18, 127-28, 135, 139. 
180. See H.R. 908, § l(b)(3). 
181. See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 15, at 1; see also supra text accompanying notes 127-
28. 
182. See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 135, 139. 
183. See H.R. 908, § l(b)(3). 
184. See id. 
185. See supra p. 216. 
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consistent with core precepts of fairness and due process, Congress 
apparently intended the entity to scrutinize additional measures and 
suggest those that would promote prompt and efficacious resolution 
while satisfying fundamental tenets of equity and due process. 
Certain aspects of the legislative history, particularly those mention-
ing various alternatives to structural modifications, support this 
construction. For instance, the House Committee Report alludes to the 
prospect of authorizing more judgeships, which is an important non-
structural option, and one which the Federal Courts Study Committee 
explicitly recommended, as well as to that entity's endorsement of no 
structural approach and its call for greater inquiry and discussion.186 
Moreover, during the House floor debate, one commission proponent 
observed that "as we enter the 21st century, we need to take a look at 
the entire range of possibilities."187 It is also important to remember 
that Congress did not adopt language in identical Senate and House bills 
that would have commanded the commission to recommend "appropriate 
changes in circuit boundaries or structure."188 
Congress clearly envisioned that the commission would emphasize 
structural alterations when examining alternatives and making sugges-
tions; however, confining the entity to structural modifications would 
have been overly narrow. Congress and the courts have many non-
structural options that they can apply to address the complications 
created by docket growth and by other phenomena that appeals courts 
are addressing and will continue to meet. Illustrative are legislative 
authorization for additional judgeships; efficiency measures, such as 
administrative units and a limited en bane procedure, which the Ninth 
Circuit has deployed; and numerous other techniques, namely limitations 
on oral arguments and written decisions and various alternatives to 
dispute resolution (ADR), that all of the regional circuits have in-
voked.189 
Finally, even if the commission concludes that Congress intended it 
only to consider and recommend changes in appellate court structure, 
the statutory terminology, "circuit boundaries or structure," which 
Congress employed could be read rather comprehensively. 190 For 
186. See supra text accompanying notes 128, 132. The report and the commission's 
advocates also stated that the entity would continue the Federal Courts Study Committee's work, 
thus intimating that the commission would study the options that the committee examined. 
187. See 143 CONG. REC. H3224 (daily ed. June 3, 1997) (statement of Rep. Lofgren). 
188. See S. 283, § 1(b)(3), 105th Cong., 1st Sess. (1997); H.R. 639, § l(b)(3), 105th Cong., 
1st Sess. (1997). 
189. See supra text accompanying notes 17, 41-46; see also infra notes 231-33, 266-68 and 
accompanying text. 
190. See S. 283, § l(b)(3); H.R. 639, § 1(b)(3). 
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instance, the Federal Courts Study Committee included in its examina-
tion of alterations that the committee characterized as structural the 
creation of a new appellate tier and national subject matter courts, 
possibilities which seem broader than merely reconfiguring the existing 
regional circuits. 191 
B. Suggestions for Efficacious Use of 
Commission Time 
Congress allotted the commission less than twelve months to 
complete a very significant, exceedingly difficult, and potentially 
enormous undertaking. The entity, therefore, must ensure that it makes 
the best use of the relatively limited time that Congress afforded. The 
commission could implement a number of approaches that could enable 
it to proceed most efficaciously. 
1. Information Collection 
One important issue that the entity must initially face is whether it 
should attempt to collect, analyze, and synthesize systematically original 
empirical data. Of course, the commission would prefer to have the 
maximum amount of this information feasible; however, the temporal 
restraints under which it is laboring may well preclude the compilation 
and assessment of any such material. For example, the resolution of 
complex appeals in many appellate courts and of numerous cases in the 
Ninth Circuit currently requires greater time than the entity has to 
conclude its work. 
Perhaps the most that the commission might hope to achieve is 
selective or representative sampling of empirical data. Several reasons 
suggest that the Ninth Circuit would be an obvious candidate for this 
treatment. First, Congress specifically instructed the commission to 
emphasize the court.192 Second, the Ninth Circuit typifies in significant 
ways the other large appellate courts.193 Third, practically all of the 
appeals courts are experiencing and addressing many problems that the 
Ninth Circuit has encountered and treated. 194 Fourth, the Ninth Circuit 
itself and evaluators who are not affiliated with the court have assem-
bled and analyzed considerable empirical information relating to the 
circuit. Insofar as the commission can collect empirical material on 
appellate courts apart from the Ninth Circuit, the entity may want to 
191. See REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMrITEE, supra note 26, at 119-21. 
192. See supra text accompanying note 163. 
193. See supra text accompanying note 177. 
194. See supra text accompanying notes 41-43. 
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focus on those that could function as exemplars for certain of the 
remaining courts. For instance, the apparent similarities between the 
Eighth and Tenth Circuits as well as among the Second, Third, and 
Seventh Circuits might mean that these courts deserve emphasis. 195 
The commission should assemble empirical data on docket size, 
composition, and complexity in the regional circuits; the resourc-
es-especially judges-that courts have to treat appeals; and the time 
required, and the measures that they use, to resolve cases. The entity 
could glean material through interviewing or circulating questionnaires 
to judges, attorneys, and parties who participate in appeals. The 
commission might correspondingly consult or rely on the survey 
instruments employed by the FJC in its 1993 assessment and in other 
endeavors, such as the Center's Rule 11 work, and those instruments on 
which additional entities, including the Federal Courts Study Committee 
and the Administrative Office of the United States Courts, have relied. 
The commission also could "take up where the Federal Courts Study 
Committee left off' by scrutinizing the committee's findings as to 
problems and solutions, such as the five structural alternatives that the 
entity explored. The commission might concomitantly review the 
determinations and recommendations regarding the appeals courts in the 
1995 Judicial Conference evaluation and the 1993 FJC analysis. 
Regardless of whether the commission decides to gather original 
empirical information, it must assemble and consider the largest quantity 
of empirical data and other relevant material that evaluators have 
previously collected on the regional circuits. For example, there have 
been ten major analyses of the appellate courts since the time of the 
Hruska Commission endeavor.196 The FJC, the Judicial Conference and 
the Federal Courts Study Committee have recently completed assess-
ments according varied emphasis to the appeals courts. 197 
The efforts of Senator Charles Grassley (R-Iowa), chair of the Senate 
Judiciary Subcommittee on Administrative Oversight and the Courts, to 
evaluate appellate caseloads, judicial resources and practices also could 
be a helpful source of information.198 Moreover, the regional circuits 
195. See supra p. 216. 
196. See supra text accompanying note 25. 
197. See supra text accompanying notes 32, 34. The FJC study is the only one whose 
principal focus is the appeals courts. See also REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY 
COMMfITEE, supra note 26. 
198. See, e.g., Bruce Brown, Grassley Has Judges Grousing, THE AM. LAW., Mar. 1996, 
at 16 (describing a survey Senator Grassley sent to all federal judges); Hearings on Judgeship 
Allocations Continue, THE THIRD BRANCH, Oct 1997, at 4; see also Carl Tobias, Choosing 
Federal Judges in the Second Clinton Administration, 24 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 741, 753 
(1997). 
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themselves as well as the FJC and the Administrative Office of the 
United States Courts have voluminous material on docket size, 
constitution, and complexity, resources to decide cases, the time needed 
to conclude appeals, and the measures that courts employ to expedite 
resolution. 
The commission should seek the assistance of numerous public and 
private entities that possess considerable empirical information and 
additional relevant material as well as expertise relating to the appellate 
courts. Illustrative are the Senate and House Judiciary Committees, the 
American Law Institute, the ABA, and the National C<?nter for State 
Courts. The commission must encourage the maximum possible 
involvement in its activities by interested institutions and individuals. 
2. Identifying the Problems 
a. The Regional Circuits 
The commission must systematically identify the complications that 
pose now, and will continue to present, the greatest difficulty for the 
regional circuits and determine whether they are or will be sufficiently 
problematic to deserve remediation with measures in addition to those 
that the appeals courts now apply. The examination above-including 
considerable recent work, such as the assessments undertaken by the 
Federal Courts Study Committee, the FJC and the Judicial Confer-
ence-suggests that the increasing number and complexity of appellate 
filings as well as inadequate resources to decide the cases have been, 
and will continue being, the principal complications, but it remains 
unclear whether they are troubling enough to warrant the invocation of 
new approaches. 
There may presently or subsequently be other problems. For 
example, some federal courts observers contend that certain phenome-
na-namely the myriad combinations of judges who can resolve an issue 
in the larger circuits-that implicate multiplying dockets have fostered 
inconsistent decisionmaking among and within the appeals courts.199 
However, no empirical data show that intercircuit conflicts have caused 
difficulty in the sense that the appellate system needs more authoritative 
precedents, and the FJC found "little evidence that intracircuit inconsis-
199. See, e.g., 143 CONG. REC. S8041, S8048 (daily ed. July 24, 1997) (statement of Sen. 
Conrad Bums); 141 CONG. REC. S7504 (daily ed. May 25, 1995) (statement of Sen. Slade 
Gorton); Martha J. Dragich, Once a Century: Time for a Structural Overhaul of the Federal 
Courts, 1996 WIS. L. REV. 1, 32-39 (Federal law is becoming "incoherent" due to "caseload 
pressures and productivity-oriented reforms."). 
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tency is a significant problem."200 Rising caseloads and related factors, 
such as resource restraints, have correspondingly led to bureaucratization 
that impose disadvantages, namely the overdelegation of judges' 
responsibilities and decreased judicial accountability and visibility. 
However, no empirical information demonstrates that bureaucratization 
has created serious complications.201 
The commission, therefore, should emphasize the crisis of volume by 
attempting to identify with precision its character and effects and 
whether the situation is problematic enough to justify the implementa-
tion of additional alternatives. For instance, the entity might evaluate 
dockets' present and projected size, makeup, and complexity, the time 
that regional circuits require to decide appeals, and the resources of each 
appellate court. Illustrative are recent empirical data showing that pro se 
cases, many of which involve prisoner litigation, comprise forty percent 
of the 52,000 appeals that parties pursued during the 1996 fiscal 
year.202 Material compiled by researchers in 1995 also estimates that 
the regional circuits will receive 334,800 cases and will need 1660 
judges under the existing formula to address their dockets in the year 
2020.203 
After the commission systematically has collected, analyzed and 
synthesized all of the relevant information, it must attempt to ascertain 
as conclusively as possible whether the complications that the appellate 
courts do and will confront are so troubling as to require treatment with 
approaches that are distinct from those which they now apply.204 One 
means of making the determinations is by deciding whether the regional 
circuits currently resolve appeals fairly, promptly, inexpensively, and 
200. See Arthur D. Hellman, By Precedent Unbound: The Nature and Extent of Unresolved 
lntercircuit Conflicts, 56 U. Prrr. L. REV. 693 (1995) (affording intercircuit idea); MCKENNA, 
supra note 32, at 94 (affording intracircuit idea); see also Carl Tobias, Some Cautions About 
Structural Overhaul of the Federal Courts, 51 U. MIAMI L. REV. 389, 398-99 (1997). 
201. See MCKENNA, supra note 32, at 49-53; see generally Patricia M. Wald, The Problem 
with the Courts: Black-Robed Bureaucracy, or Collegiality Under Challenge?, 42 Mo. L. REV. 
766 (1983). 
202. See 143 CONG. REC. H3223, H3224 (daily ed. June 3, 1997) (statement of Rep. Henry 
Hyde) (affording 52,000 figure); Caseload Increases Throughout Judiciary, THE THIRD BRANCH, 
Mar. 1996, at 1, 2 (affording 40% and prisoner litigation figures from 1995). 
203. See LoNG RANGE PLAN, supra note 34, at 15-16; see also MCKENNA, supra note 32, 
at 23-53 (indicating courts address dockets of diverse size and complexity with disparate 
resources and consume different time reaching decisions and discrepancies in dependence on 
measures, namely ADR and staff, and in oral arguments and dispositions accorded appeals). 
204. The entity also may attempt to identify instructive correlations, such as that between 
circuit size and time for resolution or case precedent's consistency. See MCKENNA, supra note 
32, at 94. The entity as well might calibrate the above disparities' effects in terms of parameters, 
including litigant satisfaction and resource savings. 
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consistently. Should the commission find that the courts do not so 
process cases, the deployment of additional options might be indicated. 
Another way of reaching these judgments is to identify the impacts that 
the applicable difficulties and remedial measures have on the appellate 
ideal: the traditional idea that judges hear oral arguments, closely confer, 
and write thoroughly-reasoned opinions that explain the results and that 
are publicly available in all appeals.205 The commission may ascertain 
that courts essentially honor this ideal because, for example, judges 
afford oral arguments and written decisions to those cases that need 
them. If the entity does so find, it should conclude that the complica-
tions are insufficiently problematic to justify the adoption of new 
mechanisms. Considerable information presently suggests, and the 
commission might well determine, that the regional circuits do not and 
will not face difficulties that are troubling enough to warrant employ-
ment of techniques other than the ones that the appeals courts now use. 
b. Ninth Circuit 
The commission must specifically focus on the precise complications 
that the Ninth Circuit is experiencing and will encounter and whether 
they cause sufficient concern to require the implementation of alterna-
tives, particularly structural options, that would augment the many 
measures the court has already applied. Most important will be the 
current and future size, composition, and complexity of dockets; the 
resources, especially judges, for deciding appeals; and the time required 
for terminating cases. For example, the Ninth Circuit now has twenty-
eight active judges to address the largest appellate docket of 8500 yearly 
filings, and these statistics prompted the Judicial Conference to request 
that Congress authorize ten additional judgeships for the court. Quite 
significant will be the efficacy of mechanisms, particularly the limited 
en bane procedure, which the Ninth Circuit presently applies. 
The commission should scrutinize the pace of Ninth Circuit 
dispositions. Recent information suggests that the court resolves appeals 
more promptly in terms of certain parameters than most circuits and less 
expeditiously than some in other ways.206 The commission must refine 
this material and use it and any additional information that the entity 
can collect to ascertain whether the court needs greater time for treating 
cases than the remaining circuits, and, if so, the commission should 
attempt to identify exactly when and why temporal disparities arise in 
205. See BAKER, supra note 25, at 21-27; REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY 
COMMITTEE, supra note 26, at 109. 
206. See SECONDS. 956 PosmoN PAPER, supra note 77, at 7; see also MCKENNA, supra 
note 32, at 32-35 (analyzing circuit disposition times). 
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the appellate process. For instance, thne to resolution may be a function 
of the docket's magnitude, constitution, or complexity; the available 
judicial resources, including the ten vacant judgeships; the comparatively 
high percentage of cases in which the court grants oral arguments and 
issues written opinions; or the circuit's substantial contingent of judges, 
a factor which purportedly erodes collegiality and, thus, may delay 
dispositions. 207 
Some observers of the Ninth Circuit also claim that the size of the 
court, particularly the circuit's enormous docket, contributes to conflicts 
in the court's case law. However, no empirical information presently 
demonstrates that intracircuit inconsistency poses significant difficulty, 
while the only systematic study of the operation of precedent in a large 
appeals court found that the Ninth Circuit has generally succeeded in 
avoiding conflicts between panel decisions.208 
Individuals who favor bifurcating the court have concomitantly 
expressed dissatisfaction with its decisionmaking in substantive 
areas-such as natural resources, criminal law and the death penal-
ty-proffering as evidence the substantial percentage of Ninth Circuit 
determinations that the Supreme Court reverses.209 Critics of circuit-
splitting have responded that this concern primarily implicates certain 
statutory requirements with which these circuit-division proponents 
disagree and, therefore, the advocates should persuade Congress to 
change the applicable legislation.210 Moreover, the reversal rate is not 
very probative,211 partly because it can be attributed to many variables, 
most of which only tangentially involve Ninth Circuit decisionmaking. 
These include the factors that animate lawyers and litigants to appeal, 
the peculiar, and perhaps idiosyncratic, phenomena which prompt the 
Justices to review specific cases and the law, facts, and policy that lead 
the Supreme Court to resolve particular appeals as it does. The 
commission, accordingly, might examine the consistency of Ninth 
207. See SECONDS. 956 PosmoN PAPER, supra note 77, at 5; infra text accompanying 
note 213. It presently appears that the region's population will dramatically increase in the near 
future and exacerbate certain of these phenomena, such as growing appeals. 
208. See MCKENNA, supra note 32, at 94; see generally Arthur D. Hellman, Maintaining 
Consistency in the Law of the l.Arge Circuit, in RESTRUCTURING JUSTICE 55-90 (Arthur D. 
Hellman ed., 1990); Arthur D. Hellman, Breaking the Banc: The Common-I.Aw Process in the 
l.Arge Appellate Court, 23 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 915 (1991); Hellman, supra note 67. The commission 
should specifically ascertain whether the limited, en bane mechanism facilitates consistency. 
209. See, e.g., 143 CONG. REC. S8041, S8044 (daily ed. July 24, 1997) (statement of Sen. 
Gorton); id. at S8047 (statement of Sen. Bums); see also supra text accompanying note 71. 
210. See supra text accompanying note 72. 
211. See, e.g., David G. Savage, Getting the High Court's Attention, A.B.A. J., Nov. 1997, 
at 46 (quoting Ninth Circuit Chief Judge Procter Hug, Jr. and Ninth Circuit Judge Stephen S. 
Trott); see also Baker, supra note 6, at 943-44; Tobias, supra note 7, at 1373-74. 
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Circuit precedent and the court's substantive determinations more 
generally, although these inquiries may well prove unproductive. 
Because the Ninth Circuit addresses the largest docket it probably 
places greater reliance on staff than other courts. For example, Ninth 
Circuit staff attorneys screen many cases, especially pro se and prisoner 
litigation, to help suggest the oral and Written dispositions that those 
appeals will receive and to minimize the possibility of intracircuit 
inconsistency.212 The commission, therefore, should attempt to deter-
mine whether this enhanced bureaucratization has detrimentally affected 
case resolution by, for instance, overdelegating judicial tasks or 
disproportionately increasing the time that judges must devote to staff 
management.213 
The commission must remember that important criticisms leveled at 
the court by circuit-splitting champions can be ascribed to phenomena 
for which the court has little responsibility. Illustrative are claims that 
circuit precedent is inconsistent, that the court consumes too much time 
in resolving appeals, and that its magnitude undermines collegiality-an 
attribute which allegedly limits potential conflicts in case law and 
expedites resolution. Insofar as circuit precedent lacks consistency, 
appellate dispositions are delayed, or there is insufficient collegiality, the 
phenomena appear to result principally from current vacancies in ten 
active judgeships and partly from the court's concomitant need to rely 
on judges who are not its active members.214 
Finally, the commission must attempt to ascertain as definitively as 
possible whether the Ninth Circuit does or will address difficulties that 
are troubling enough to justify the application of approaches apart from 
the plethora of mechanisms that the court has used or could employ. For 
example, some material indicates, and the entity may find, that the 
measures instituted-including the resources committed-by the Ninth 
Circuit have enabled the court to resolve its gigantic docket equitably, 
promptly, economically, and consistently while minimally affecting the 
appellate ideal. Accordingly, retention of the status quo or continued 
experimentation with previously tested or new non-structural approaches 
will apparently be indicated. 
212. See supra text accompanying notes 44-45, 68. 
213. See supra text accompanying note 200. 
214. For many years, the court's enormous docket has compelled this reliance, but the 
vacancies' large number and longstanding nature have rendered the need acute. See Carl Tobias, 
Federal Judicial Selection in a Time of Divided Government, 47 EMORY L.J. (forthcoming 
1998). 
226 FWRIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 49 
3. Identifying the Solutions 
If the commission conclusively determines that the regional circuits, 
the appellate system, or the Ninth Circuit does or will encounter 
complications that are sufficiently problematic to require remediation 
with alternatives which the courts have not applied, it must undertake 
the broadest feasible examination of potential solutions, including their 
advantages and disadvantages. The entity also should attempt to identify 
exactly what combination of measures alone and collectively will best 
address the difficulties. 
It is impossible to denominate precisely those options that might 
prove effective and, therefore, deserve close evaluation until the 
commission has identified the most pressing complications and 
definitively concluded that they are troubling enough to warrant 
treatment. Moreover, quite a few study groups, including the Judicial 
Conference, the ABA, and the FJC, and many federal courts observers 
have assessed most of the prospects.215 I, therefore, principally provide 
descriptive analyses, rather than thorough catalogs of the benefits and 
detriments, of numerous possibilities that appear to be promising. 
Assuming that the commission clearly will find that some regional 
circuits do or will confront problems posing sufficient difficulty to 
justify the invocation of mechanisms in addition to ones that these 
courts presently use, the entity should carefully canvass a wide range of 
approaches, including internal and external reforms, that federal and 
state courts have applied or might implement. The commission must 
survey a plethora of measures because evaluators have conducted more 
research on, and therefore better understand, the relevant complications 
than the applicable remedies. 216 
When examining these options, particularly those which would 
restructure the regional circuits, the commission should recognize and 
allow for the different and sometimes conflicting reasons that observers 
propound for the courts. One traditional view, which is premised on an 
evaluation of congressional intent at the time of the original establish-
ment of the modern appellate system in 1891, holds that the appeals 
courts consist of relatively few contiguous states sharing common 
215. See, e.g., BAKER, supra note 25, at 106-286; MCKENNA, supra note 32, at 105-21, 
123-39, 141-54; see also supra text accompanying notes 18-35. 
216. Telephone Conversation with Professor Thomas E. Baker, Professor, Texas Tech 
University School of Law (Mar. 15, 1996); see also Tobias, supra note 17, at 1282. I emphasize 
the federal courts here, although Professor Baker suggests that state court reforms may be a 
fruitful source of ideas. See BAKER, supra note 25, at 298. When the commission surveys 
internal and external reforms' efficacy, the entity also may want to develop suggestions for 
improvement, if indicated. 
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interests,217 although phenomena like globalization and computerization 
may have made this idea somewhat obsolete today. Another related 
notion is that regional circuits must be close geographically, and in 
terms of perspectives, to the district courts whose decisions the appeals 
courts review and to the people whom they serve.218 
Additional conceptualizations differ significantly from these views. 
One idea is that the regional circuits should be diverse, for instance, in 
terms of judges' political perspectives, race, gender, or backgrounds as 
well as the economic, social and other interests of those jurisdictions 
which constitute the courts.219 A second important purpose of the 
regional circuits is their federalizing function: the responsibility to 
harmonize the Constitution and national policies with state and local 
concerns.220 These views resist felicitous reconciliation, although the 
commission should remember, and provide for, their inherent tensions. 
The entity must extensively explore the advantages and disadvantages 
of applying the various alternatives, such as the options' effects on the 
Supreme Court, the district courts, the appellate ideal, and economic 
costs. For example, every regional circuit has addressed docket 
expansion by imposing limitations on the oral arguments granted and 
written decisions afforded and by relying more substantially on non-
judicial staff. The commission should attempt to delineate the exact 
present and future impacts of these restrictions and of enhanced use of 
staff on the appellate ideal.221 Moreover, Congress's traditional solu-
tion to appeals court caseload growth of enlarging the bench and 
reconfiguring regional circuits may now be outmoded or only a 
palliative because the response apparently has negligible effect on 
appellate dockets.222 Authorizing additional judgeships could corre-
spondingly increase resources and expedite dispositions. Nonetheless, 
this measure might erode collegiality and promote intracircuit inconsis-
217. See Tobias, supra note 7, at 1371-73 (quoting Sen. Mark Hatfield). 
218. See, e.g., 143 CONG. REC. at S8047 (statement of Sen. Bums); but see id. at S8058-59 
(statement of Sen. Joseph Biden) ("[g]eography is relevant only in terms of convenience-not 
ideology"). 
219. See supra text accompanying notes 21 & 65; infra text accompanying notes 293, 317. 
220. See John M. Wisdom, Requiemfora Great Court, 26 LoY. L. REV. 787, 788 (1980); 
see also Baker, supra note 6, at 942; Tobias, supra note 7, at 1372-73; supra note 218 
(statement of Sen. Biden). See generally CHARLES A. WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COUJn'S § 3, 
at 10-13 (5th ed. 1994). 
221. See supra text accompanying note 204. The entity also might consider the benefits for 
justice and the costs, especially economic, of reattaining the ideal. See generally William M. 
Richman & William L. Reynolds, Elitism, Expediency, and the New Certiorari: Requiem for The 
Learned Hand Tradition, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 273 (1996); Tobias, supra note 17, at 1281. 
222. See Baker, supra note 6, at 945-49; Tobias, supra note 7, at 1386-90; see also infra 
text accompanying notes 223-25, 273-77, 309. 
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tency. Indeed, it may be an empty gesture if the President and the 
Senate cannot overcome their chronic inability to fill large numbers of 
vacancies in those judicial seats that Congress has already approved.223 
The commission must then designate the finest remedies for each 
appeals court and the appellate system by comparing the options, 
relative efficacy in terms of these benefits and detriments. It is 
impossible to provide very specific guidance until the entity has 
carefully evaluated the relevant problems and solutions. However, the 
commission should employ a finely-calibrated analysis that, for instance, 
tailors the available approaches to the difficulties that particular regional 
circuits and the system confront and emphasizes alternatives that will 
offer the maximum advantages and impose the least disadvantages. 
The individuals who serve on the commission and its staff should 
remember that there are numerous non-structural possibilities that have 
fostered prompt, fair, inexpensive, and consistent resolution of appeals 
and have essentially honored the appellate ideal. Moreover, these 
measures could prove preferable to realignment partly because they 
would be less extreme and disruptive. For example, the Judicial 
Conference seemingly considered the "disruption of precedent and 
judicial administration that [structural] changes generally entail', so 
troubling as to recommend emphatically that circuit reconfiguration 
"occur only if compelling empirical evidence demonstrates adjudicative 
or administrative disfunction in a court so that it cannot continue to 
deliver quality justice and coherent, consistent circuit law in the face of 
increasing workload.,,224 In 1993, the FJC clearly found that the appel-
late "system and its judges are under stress,, but admonished that the 
pressure did "not appear to be a stress that would be significantly 
relieved by structural change.,,ns Additional observers correspondingly 
contend that realignment is inefficacious and outmoded primarily 
because reconfiguration effectively reallocates, rather than directly 
addresses, workload.226 These ideas indicate that the commission must 
closely evaluate realignment, proceed cautiously in proposing it, and 
perhaps only suggest reconfiguration as a last resort. Indeed, some 
material shows, and the entity may well conclude, that the best approach 
223. See generally Gordon Berrnant et al., Judicial Vacancies: An Examination of the 
Problem and Possible Solutions, 14 MISS. C. L. REV. 319 (1994); supra text accompanying note 
213; infra text accompanying notes 273-76. 
224. See LoNG RANGE PLAN, supra note 34, at 44. Circuit restructuring "should continue 
to be, as it has been historically, an infrequent event." Id. at 45 (citation omitted). 
225. MCKENNA, supra note 32, at 155. 
226. See infra text accompanying notes 277, 309; see also infra text accompanying notes 
304-06, 310-11 (affording more reasons why restructuring is inadvisable). 
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today would be a refined mix of potential solutions, none of which 
seems to be structural. 
Finally, the commission's members and staff should keep in mind 
some salient phenomena when reviewing possible remedies for both the 
regional appeals courts and the Ninth Circuit. They must remember that 
the continuation of both caseload growth and almost exclusive reliance 
on periodic authorization of additional judgeships and occasional 
realignment of appellate courts by Congress and the judiciary means that 
the other eleven courts will increasingly grow to resemble the Ninth 
Circuit. These phenomena's continuation, therefore, would provide an 
important reason why the Ninth Circuit should remain intact.227 
a. The Regional Circuits 
The commission must analyze the broadest possible spectrum of 
measures. I essentially rely upon the organizational format that Professor 
Thomas E. Baker followed in his recent thorough examination of the 
appellate courts and of the internal and external alternatives that the 
regional circuits have employed or might use.228 Thus, I initially 
examine internal reforms that appeals courts have implemented or could 
effectuate and then explore past and proposed external options. 
i. Past and Present Internal Reforms 
The regional circuits have applied a plethora of approaches to treat 
the difficulties that they confront. Every appellate court has imposed 
restrictions on the number of, and the time allotted for, oral argu-
ments229 and has accorded appeals a wide spectrum of types of dispo-
sitions, including thoroughly-reasoned written opinions, unpublished 
decisions and various forms of summary determinations.230 These 
227. I appreciate the tension between my exploration of many alternatives which Congress 
and the judiciary might implement and my assumption that their essential inaction will continue. 
However, this approach allows for the contingency that my assumption will be incorrect. 
228. See BAKER, supra note 25, at xviii-xix, 106-286. Professor Balcer employs the terms 
intramural and extramural; however, I employ the more traditional terminology of internal or 
procedural solutions and external or structural solutions. 
229. See, e.g., !ST CIR. R. 34.l; 5TH CIR. R. 34; see also FED. R. APP. P. 34; BAKER, supra 
note 25, at 108 (discussing experimentation with nonargument summary calendar); JOE S. CECIL 
& DONNA STIENSTRA, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, DECIDING CASES WITHOUT ARGUMENT: AN 
EXAMINATION OF FOUR COURI'S OF APPEALS (1987). See generally BAKER, supra note 25, at 
108-17. 
230. See, e.g., 4TH CIR. R. 36(a)-(c); llTH CIR. R. 36-1 to 36-3; see also BAKER, supra 
note 25, at 117-19 (discussing limitations on briefs). See generally BAKER, supra note 25, at 
119-35. 
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limitations have apparently facilitated case resolution, but they may have 
undermined the appellate ideal.231 
Numerous regional circuits deploy civil appeal management plans 
(CAMP).232 The plans have similar objectives, although their emphases 
and specifics differ.233 Each CAMP attempts to encourage case termi-
nations without court action, accelerate the consideration and disposition 
of appeals that receive oral argument, narrow and clarify the issues at 
stake, improve briefing and argument, and resolve motions and 
procedural questions informally and promptly.234 The measures em-
ployed encompass prehearing conferences, appeal tracking forms that 
permit processing to commence before records and briefs are filed, staff 
monitoring and modification of briefing schedules, and early case 
assignments to panels.235 
Every court that uses a CAMP and even the circuits that do not rely 
substantially on staff to discharge certain responsibilities, such as the 
screening of appeals and the drafting of opinions.236 The CAMP 
programs and enhanced dependence on staff generally have expedited 
case disposition and probably saved judicial resources. However, they 
have apparently eroded somewhat the appellate ideal and raised generic 
concerns-including overdelegation of judicial duties-about reliance on 
staff.237 Some appeals courts employ numerous additional mechanisms. 
For example, a few circuits have instituted special procedures to 
facilitate the treatment of cases that involve capital punishment,238 
while each appellate court has depended on senior and visiting judges 
to help resolve expanding dockets.239 
231. See, e.g., Stephen Reinhardt, A Plea to Save the Federal Courts: Too Few Judges, Too 
Many Cases, A.B.A. J., Jan. 1993, at 52; Richman & Reynolds, supra note 221, at 274-76. 
232. See, e.g., U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, Civil Appeals Management 
Plan; JAMES B. EAGLIN, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, THE PRE-ARGUMENT CONFERENCE 
PROGRAM IN 111E SIXTii CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS: AN EVALUATION (1990). I rely 
substantially here on BAKER, supra note 25, at 135-39. 
233. See BAKER, supra note 25, at 136. 
234. See id. 
235. See, e.g., 8111 CIR. R. 33A; lOTH CIR. R. 33.1. 
236. See, e.g., 6111 CIR. R. 18 (concerning pre-argument conferences); 9TH CIR. R. 33-1 
(stating conferences are to facilitate settlements); see also BAKER, supra note 25, at 139-47. 
237. See supra text accompanying notes 200, 212. 
238. See Tobias, supra note 7, at 1406; see also 3RD CIR. R. 111 (regarding death penalty 
appeals); 9TH CIR. R. 22-1 to 22-6 (same). 
239. See BAKER, supra note 25, at 198-201; MCKENNA, supra note 32, at 38-39; Richman 
& Reynolds, supra note 221, at 287. For more discussion of these reforms, see BAKER, supra 
note 25, at 106-50; MCKENNA, supra note 32, at 38-53. 
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ii. Proposed Internal Reforms 
Several study entities, such as the Judicial Conference, the Federal 
Courts Study Committee and the FJC, and many additional federal 
courts observers have analyzed a substantial number of internal reforms 
that the regional circuits might implement. Appeals courts have not 
effectuated some of these alternatives; however, others have received 
practical application, much of which may fairly be characterized as 
experimental in nature. 
All of the regional circuits have relied on some form of technology, 
principally to realize efficiencies when treating docket growth.240 For 
instance, the Third Circuit was apparently the first court to institute an 
electronic mail system, while the Eleventh Circuit has employed an 
automated case management scheme and facsimile network for 
monitoring capital appeals.241 These and other courts apparently have 
saved resources. Nevertheless, Professor Baker has called for additional 
research and development in the field of computer-based case and court 
management information systems.242 He also has admonished that it 
"would be a misplaced hope to expect future technology to do more 
than provide added increments of efficiency" because judging is 
intrinsically a labor-intensive human endeavor.243 
Most, but particularly the larger, regional circuits have depended 
substantially on differentiated case management.244 I examined 
prototypical case management plans above;245 however, some observers 
have recommended this methodology's extension and a few courts have 
experimented with newer techniques. For example, the Fifth Circuit has 
tested a screening mechanism, which relies substantially on ad hoc, in-
person, three-judge screening panels, and this project may evolve into 
a second generation procedure for appeals management.246 Some 
240. See BAKER, supra note 25, at 152-58; see also Charles W. Nihan & Russell R. 
Wheeler, Using Technology to Improve the Administration of Justice in the Federal Courts, 1981 
B.Y.U. L. REV. 659, 666-67. See generally ELDRIDGE ADAMS, COURTS AND COMPUTERS (1992). 
241. See BAKER, supra note 25, at 152-53; see also J. Michael Greenwood, Follow-Up 
Study of Word Processing and Electronic Mail in the Third Circuit Court of Appeals (1980), 
reprinted in MANAGING APPEALS IN FEDERAL COURTS 801 (FJC 1988). 
242. See BAKER, supra note 25, at 152. See generally Nihan & Wheeler, supra note 240. 
243. See BAKER, supra note 25, at 154. See generally Douglas E. Winter, Down-Time: A 
Fable, LmG., Fall 1986, at 48 (envisioning a future where all disputes are resolved by 
computers). 
244. See BAKER, supra note 25, at 158-64; MCKENNA, supra note 32, at 127-33. See 
generally William L. Whittaker, Differentiated Case Management in United States Courts of 
Appeals, 63 F.R.D. 457, 458 (1974). 
245. See supra text accompanying notes 229-35. 
246. See BAKER, supra note 25, at 160; see also MCKENNA, supra note 32, at 127-29 
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circuits also employ inventorying, which is essentially a more sophisti-
cated means to differentiate cases.247 Another approach with which a 
few courts have successfully experimented is the screening of appeals 
for jurisdictional defects, so cases that are deficient might be dismissed 
as early in the appellate process as possible. 248 Perhaps the greatest 
concern about differentiated case management is that those appeals 
requiring conventional review will receive this treatment.249 
The appellate courts might implement reforms other than ones that 
implicate non-decisional, administrative matters. Some judges and 
writers have recommended ways to enhance the art of judging through 
the maintenance and improvement of judicial productivity.250 A helpful 
illustration is the imposition of deadlines. Several regional circuits have 
profitably tested temporal requirements251 and Professor Baker found 
that they "are an effective tool whose usefulness has not been fully 
developed in the Courts of Appeals."252 Nonetheless, he doubted that 
exhorting judges to "do more and do better" work would yield signifi-
cant benefits, given the substantial number of measures which regional 
circuits have applied over the last three decades.253 
Another possibility would be appellate court use of expert advi-
sors. 254 District judges have occasionally depended on individuals with 
specialized expertise, and the Ninth Circuit recently appointed an 
appellate commissioner.255 Congress could authorize these officials to 
resolve non-merits motions that implicate the time, place, and manner 
(analyzing differentiated appeals management or two-track appellate review). 
247. See BAKER, supra note 25, at 161-63; see also Hellman, supra note 17, at 957-64 
(describing the inventory process used in the Ninth Circuit). 
248. See BAKER, supra note 25, at 160-61; see also Bernard S. Meyer, Justice, 
Bureaucracy, Structure, and Simplification, 42 MD. L. REY. 659, 693 (1983). 
249. See MCKENNA, supra note 32, at 129; Oakley, supra note 44, at 922. 
250. See, e.g., Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Reflections on the Independence, Good Behavior, and 
Workload of Federal Judges, 55 U. COLO. L. REY. 1, 15-16 (1983) (noting Judge Henry J. 
Friendly's "argument for the elimination of most of the federal courts' diversity jurisdiction"); 
Stuart S. Nagel & Miriam K Mills, Using Management Science to Assign Judges to Casetypes, 
40 U. MIAMI L. REY. 1317 (1986). 
251. See BAKER, supra note 25, at 167-68; Wald, supra note 201, at 785. 
252. See BAKER, supra note 25, at 168; see also Patricia McGowan Wald, The Problem 
with the Courts: Black-Robes Bureaucracy or Collegiality Under Challenge?, TRIAL, June 1984, 
at 28, 33. 
253. See BAKER, supra note 25, at 168. See generally Frank M. Coffin, Grace Under 
Pressure: A Call for Judicial Self-Help, 50 Omo ST. L.J. 399 (1989). 
254. See BAKER, supra note 25, at 173-76. 
255. See Harold Leventhal, Environmental Decisionmaking and the Role of the Courts, 122 
U. PA. L. REY. 509, 552-53 (1974) (describing a proposal that appellate judges have access to 
"a scientific assistant"); see also Telephone Conversation with Mark Mendenhall, Assistant 
Circuit Executive, U.S. Courts for the Ninth Circuit (Oct. 20, 1997). 
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of appeals and to oversee screening programs.256 A few commentators 
and study entities have asserted that reliance on the officers appears 
sufficiently promising to warrant controlled experimentation.257 
Some observers have correspondingly explored various efforts that 
may limit the pursuit of frivolous appellate filings through the increased 
imposition of sanctions under statute, rule, or inherent power.258 An 
expert ABA Committee concluded that more frequent invocation of 
sanctions would not appreciably decrease circuit workloads because only 
very weak appeals would be deterred,259 while several writers have 
evinced concern that greater sanctioning activity could threaten the 
appellate tradition.2ro 
The commission must scrutinize additional proposals, which neither 
Congress nor the federal regional circuits have officially adopted or 
applied. One option is authorizing fewer than three judges to resolve 
certain cases, such as those that involve single issues and that are 
reviewed under deferential standards.261 This approach would save 
judicial resources, but it might diminish the quality of decisionmaking 
in specific appeals or more broadly.262 A second possibility would 
increase oral argument and deemphasize written presentations.263 
Limited experimentation indicates that this model could be workable and 
efficient within an inventory scheme for ordinary cases.264 Professor 
Baker concluded that "pursuing greater orality, selectively and in 
carefully chosen appeals, might prove a useful differentiation of the 
appellate practice. "265 
256. See Oakley, supra note 44, at 920. 
257. See BAKER, supra note 25, at 176; REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY 
COMMITTEE, supra note 26, at 115-16. 
258. See 28 U.S.C. § 1912 (1994); FED. R. APP. P. 38; Roadway Express v. Piper, 447 U.S. 
752, 763-64 (1980). 
259. See ABA Report, supra note 25, at 547-48. 
260. See BAKER, supra note 25, at 180; see also Fred Woods, Sanctions-Stepchild or 
Natural Heir to Trial and Appellate Court Delay Reduction?, 17 PEPP. L. REV. 665, 681 (1990) 
(concluding that sanctions "consistently and properly imposed, in keeping with constitutional due 
process," will result in "a marked improvement in our backlogged calendars"). 
261. See ABA Report, supra note 25, at 115-16; LoNG RANGE PLAN, supra note 34, at 
131-32; MCKENNA, supra note 32, at 127-33; infra note 295. 
262. See BAKER, supra note 25, at 173; Tobias, supra note 7, at 1400. 
263. See Daniel J. Meador, Toward Orality and Visibility in the Appellate Process, 42 Mo. 
L. REV. 732, 747-51 (1983). 
264. See id. at 738-47; see also BAKER, supra note 25, at 165-66. But see ROBERI' J. 
MARTINEAU, APPELLATE JUSTICE IN ENGLAND AND THE UNITED STATES (1990). 
265. BAKER, supra note 25, at 166. Administrative units and the limited en bane are 
reforms aimed primarily at larger courts, and only the Ninth Circuit has used them extensively. 
See id. at 155-58; see also supra notes 42-43 and accompanying text. For more discussion of 
these reforms, see BAKER, supra note 25, at 151-85; MCKENNA, supra note 32, at 127-39. 
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iii. Past and Present External Reforms 
Congress and the regional circuits have implemented numerous 
external reforms, most of which deserve little treatment because they 
have previously been rather ineffective and will probably prove no more 
efficacious if applied in the future. For example, there have been, and 
might be, efforts to restrict the district courts' original jurisdiction, 
although Congress appears unlikely to cease adopting new criminal 
statutes or creating additional civil causes of action, much less circum-
scribe existing civil or criminal jurisdiction, in the foreseeable fu-
ture. 266 Congress and the courts could correspondingly implement 
various alternatives to dispute resolution that, similar to limitations on 
original jurisdiction, directly aim at the trial court level and only 
derivatively implicate the appellate tier.267 Numerous federal districts 
have applied a broad spectrum of these options, and the Civil Justice 
Reform Act (CJRA) of 1990 has recently propelled this develop-
ment.268 Reliance on ADR in the trial courts will probably continue to 
increase, and that growth may reduce the demand for judicial resources, 
although the relatively nascent character of much experimentation 
precludes definitive conclusions.269 
Another approach is improvement of the quality of federal legisla-
tion, the clarification of which would ostensibly reduce the judicial 
resources that courts must devote to statutory interpretation and limit 
inconsistent decisionmaking.270 The District of Columbia Circuit has 
instituted a pilot project meant to foster constructive communication 
regarding legislation between Congress and the judiciary.271 Some 
266. See, e.g., Tobias, supra note 17, at 1269 & n.22 and sources cited therein. 
267. See A. Leo Levin & Deirdre Golash, Alternative Dispute Resolution in Federal 
District Courts, 37 U. FLA. L. REV. 29, 29-33 (1985); Lauren K. Robel, Caseload and Judging: 
Judicial Adaptations to Caseload, 1990 B.Y.U. L. REV. 3, 24-29; see also Kim Dayton, The 
Myth of Alternative Dispute Resolution in the Federal Courts, 16 IOWA L. REV. 889, 891 (1991). 
268. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 471-82 (1994); see also Carl Tobias, Civil Justice Reform and the 
Balkanization of Federal Civil Procedure, 24 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1393, 1393, 1420-21 (1992). See 
generally DONNA STIENSTRA ET AL., FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, REPoRT TO THE JUDICIAL 
CONFERENCE COMMIITEE ON COURT ADMINISTRATION AND CASE MANAGEMENT, A STUDY OF 
THE FlvE DEMONSTRATION PROGRAMS EsTABLISHED UNDER THE CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM ACT 
OF 1990 (1997). 
269. See BAKER, supra note 25, at 197; Stephen Breyer, Administering Justice in the First 
Circuit, 24 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 29, 44 (1990). See generally ELIZABETH PLAPINGER ET AL., 
ADR AND SETTLEMENT IN THE FEDERAL DISTRICT COURI'S: A SOURCEBOOK FOR JUDGES & 
LAWYERS (1996). 
270. See BAKER, supra note 25, at 224-27. 
271. See Cris Carmody, Branches Try to Communicate, NAT'L L.J., July 19, 1993, at 3; see 
also 138 CONG. REC. Sl7537 (daily ed. Oct. 8, 1992) (statement of Sen. Mitchell); BAKER, 
supra note 25, at 225-26. 
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observers have concomitantly called for the implementation of jurisdic-
tional impact statements or congressional checklists, addressing matters 
such as private causes of action, preemption, and statutes of limitation, 
that lawmakers would employ when drafting enactments.272 Numerous 
obstacles could frustrate successful application of these ideas. Illustrative 
are the generic, inherent complications in employing unambiguous 
phraseology; the considerable difficulty, including certain pragmatic, 
political restraints, in writing clearer statutes; the multiple plausible 
constructions that judges, lawyers and litigants can articulate; and the 
incentives that animate attorneys and parties to seek appellate review of 
legislative terminology.273 
Creating additional appellate judgeships is another possibility that I 
have mentioned at various junctures in this paper. Congress has 
traditionally employed this solution; however, the remedy has imposed 
disadvantages. For example, adding judges may exacerbate the problems 
of larger courts by increasing the likelihood of intracircuit inconsistency, 
by making en bane rehearings unwieldy, and by eroding collegiality.274 
Professor Baker concomitantly contends that authorizing more judicial 
positions "does not achieve any lasting improvement" and has merely 
had a "kind of temporary braking effect."275 An increasingly cost-
conscious Congress may be reluctant to approve additional judge-
ships,276 and many current members of the federal bench oppose its 
expansion.277 On balance, this approach apparently has limited present 
and future efficacy. 
272. See Chief Justice Burger, The State of the Federal Judiciary-1972, 58 A.B.A. J. 
1049, 1050 (1972) (suggesting that "every piece of legislation creating new cases be 
accompanied by a 'court impact statement' "); see also REPORI' OF TIIE FEDERAL COURI'S 
STUDY COMMrITEE, supra note 26, at 90-92; Meyer, supra note 248, at 671-72. 
273. See Carl Tobias, Executive Branch Civil Justice Reform, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 1521, 
1535-36 (1993); see also Tobias, supra note 198, at 751. See generally WILLIAM N. EsKRIDGE, 
DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION (1994). 
274. See Robert A. Ainsworth, Jr., Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals Reorganization Act of 
1980, 1981 B.Y.U. L. REV. 523, 526-28; Ginsburg, supra note 250, at 10-11. 
275. BAKER, supra note 25, at 202. 
276. See Irving R. Kaufman, New Remedies for the Next Century of Judicial Reform: Time 
as the Greatest Innovator, 57 FORDHAM L. REV. 253, 258 (1988); see also Baker, supra note 
6, at 948. But see Richman & Reynolds, supra note 221, at 304-07 (noting that the cost of 
additional judges must be considered in the broader context of the entire federal budget). 
277. See Gerald B. Tjoftat, More Judges, Less Justice, A.B.A. J., July 1993, at 70, 73; Jon 
0. Newman, 1,000 Judges-The Limit for an Effective Federal Judiciary, 76 JUDICATURE 187, 
188 (1993). But see Reinhardt, supra note 231. See generally GORDON BERMANT ET AL., 
FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, IMPOSING A MORATORIUM ON THE NUMBER OF FEDERAL JUDGES: 
ANALYSIS OF ARGUMENTS AND IMPLICATIONS (1993). 
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A concomitant of the option above is the division of regional circuits 
because these two alternatives have comprised the preferred solution 
historically employed by Congress. Splitting appeals courts is a limited 
reform that has apparently become outmoded. Most important, division 
affords no systemic benefit because, for instance, it only redistributes 
the workload and requires the appellate courts to resolve the identical 
number of appeals.278 
A related, but potentially more productive, option would be 
enhancement of the non-judicial resources that regional circuits have to 
resolve their burgeoning dockets. Examples are increases in the number 
of staff attorneys, judicial law clerks, and other court administrative and 
technical personnel. The devotion of these resources has apparently 
preserved judges' time and effort and improved operations by, for 
example, enabling circuits to expedite case dispositions. However, this 
solution could impose the disadvantages entailed in greater bureaucrati-
zation.279 
Specialized appellate courts afford another possibility. "Court 
specialization holds out the promise of deepening expertise, uniformity 
and stability, as judges become more experienced and encounter the full 
dimension of their subject matter."280 Nonetheless, numerous observers 
have criticized increased reliance on these tribunals for several reasons 
that principally implicate the threat which they would pose to the 
tradition of generalist judges.281 Illustrative are assertions that the 
courts' judges would develop overly narrow viewpoints, the tribunals 
would promulgate balkanizing procedures, and limited subject matter 
jurisdiction could enable special interests to influence unduly a legal 
field.282 
iv. Proposed External Reforms 
Some study groups, including the Judicial Conference, the ABA and 
the FJC, and numerous other evaluators have assessed a number of 
external reforms that the appellate courts could effectuate. The regional 
circuits have implemented relatively few of these alternatives, particular-
278. See supra notes 223-25; infra text accompanying note 309. 
279. See supra text accompanying notes 200, 212, 235. 
280. BAKER, supra note 25, at 222. 
281. See Ben F. Overton, A Prescription for the Appellate Caseload Explosion, 12 FLA. ST. 
U. L. REV. 205, 221-22 (1984); see also Edward V. Di Lello, Note, Fighting Fire with 
Fire.fighters: A Proposal for Expert Judges at the Trial Level, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 473 (1993). 
282. See Simon Rifldnd, A Special Court for Patent Litigation? The Danger of a 
Specialized Judiciary, 37 A.B.A. J. 425, 425-26 (1951); see also BAKER, supra note 25, at 222. 
For more discussion of these reforms, see BAKER, supra note 25, at 186-228; MCKENNA, supra 
note 32, at 141-54. 
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ly those that are structural, although several courts have applied certain 
measures principally for purposes of experimentation. 
The Federal Courts Study Committee did not endorse, but explored 
and urged greater analysis of, five possibilities. The first suggestion was 
that Congress periodically redraw appeals court boundaries to establish 
regional circuits of nine judges and that the current system be dis-
solved. 283 The approach would afford the benefits, especially collegiali-
ty, that courts with smaller judicial complements purportedly enjoy, but 
initial implementation could prove disruptive and subsequent effectua-
tion might foster intercircuit conflicts and undercut the appeals courts• 
federalizing role. 284 A second recommendation called for the creation 
of another appellate tier between the Supreme Court and the district 
courts.285 This proposal is premised on assumptions that the Justices 
confront an onerous workload which threatens their performance and 
that the federal courts' existing structure lacks adequate capacity to 
maintain sufficient consistency in national law.286 Each proposition is 
controversial, while Congress and the judiciary seem unlikely to 
implement an additional tier until they agree on the need for it and on 
an appropriate design.287 
A third idea was the establishment of new national subject matter 
appeals courts in areas such as admiralty, civil rights and labor.288 This 
alternative offers specialization's advantages, namely expertise, 
efficiency, and greater uniformity in the designated field of federal law, 
but it contravenes the traditional notion of generalist judges because 
each court would have a narrow focus and might be vulnerable to 
capture.289 A few regional circuits have experimented with~ subject 
matter panels in various substantive areas, including oil and gas law, 
283. See REPOIU OF THE FEDERAL COUIUS STUDY COMMITIEE, supra note 26, at 118-19. 
See generally BAKER, supra note 25, at 239-42. 
284. See HRUSKA COMMISSION, supra note 2, at 228; Baker, supra note 6, at 946. 
285. See REPOIU OF THE FEDERAL COUIUS STUDY COMMITIEE, supra note 26, at 119-20. 
See generally BAKER, supra note 25, at 242-61. 
286. See Thomas E. Baker & Douglas D. McFarland, The Need for a New National Court, 
100 HARV. L. REV. 1400, 1400-01 (1987); Robert L. Stern, Remedies for Appellate Overloads: 
The Ultimate Solution, 72 JUDICATURE 103, 103-04 (1988). 
287. See, e.g., James A. Gazell, The National Court of Appeals Controversy: An Emerging 
Negative Consensus, 6 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 1, 36-37 (1986); Note, Of High Designs: A 
Compendium of Proposals to Reduce the Workload of the Supreme Court, 97 HARV. L. REV. 
307, 310-18 (1983). 
288. See REPOIU OF THE FEDERAL COUIUS STUDY COMMITIEE, supra note 26, at 120-21; 
see also supra text accompanying notes 279-81 (exploring specialized appeals courts). 
289. See Lawrence Baum, Specializing the Federal Courts: Neutral Refonns or Efforts to 
Shape Judicial Policy?, 74 JUDICATURE 217, 217 (1991); LoNG RANGE PLAN, supra note 34, 
at 43 (Recommendation Sixteen). 
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which has enabled the courts to develop particularized expertise and 
realize certain economies.290 The Ninth Circuit successfully has 
employed Bankruptcy Appellate Panels that essentially embody this 
concept and correspondingly save the court's judicial resources.291 
The fourth proposal suggested the merger and reconfiguration of all 
present regfonal circuits into a single, centrally-organized entity.292 The 
option would provide certain efficiencies; however, initial institution 
could be disruptive and consequent implementation might be difficult to 
administer. The last recommendation was the consolidation of the 
existing appellate courts into approximately five "jumbo" circuits with 
larger judicial complements. 293 This possibility would provide several 
benefits-such as diversity and some economies-that larger appeals 
courts have secured, although numerous observers, including judges, 
have criticized the approach because it could sacrifice collegiality and 
might erode consistency.294 
There are other alternatives that the Federal Courts Study Committee 
did not consider. One would place responsibility for error correction in 
three-judge district courts with certiorari jurisdiction in three-judge 
appellate panels, thereby capitalizing on district courts' larger judicial 
capacity.295 This idea would save appeals court resources, but the 
concept might necessitate an increase in the coq>s of district judges and 
it would impose substantial appellate responsibilities on these judicial 
officers, many of whom were appointed ostensibly because they 
possessed the expertise and temperament required for trial court 
service.296 Moreover, Congress and the judiciary could formally 
290. See, e.g., REPORI' OF THE FEDERAL COURI'S STUDY COMMITIEE, supra note 26, at 
120-21. See generally Stuart S. Nagel, Systematic Assignment of Judges: A Proposal, 70 
JUDICATURE 73 (1986). 
291. See Michael A. Berch, The Bankruptcy Appellate Panel and Its Implications for 
Adoption of Specialist Panels in the Courts of Appeals, in RESTRUCTURING JUSTICE, supra note 
208, at 65-91; see also 28 U.S.C. § 158(b) (1994) (prescribing panels for all appeals courts). 
292. See REPORI' OF THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE, supra note 26, at 121; see 
also J. Clifford Wallace, The Nature and Extent of Intercircuit Conflicts: A Solution Needed for 
a Mountain or a Molehill?, 71 CAL. L. REV. 913, 940-41 (1983). 
293. See REPORI' OF THE FEDERAL COURI'S STUDY COMMITTEE, supra note 26, at 122-23. 
The existing circuits could be differently reconfigured or specific states, such as those in the 
Ninth Circuit, might be reassigned to courts, namely the Eighth or Tenth Circuits, other than 
those in which they are now situated. See HRUSKA COMMISSION, supra note 2, at 236-37; see 
also Carl Tobias, Why Congress Should Not Split the Ninth Circuit, 50 SMU L. REV. 583, 596 
(1997). 
294. See, e.g., J. Clifford Wallace, The Case for Large Federal Courts of Appeals, 77 
JUDICATURE 288, 288 (1994); Newman, supra note 277, at 187-88 (noting dangers of a large 
federal judiciary). 
295. See LoNG RANGE PLAN, supra note 34, at 131-32. 
296. See Tobias, supra note 7, at 1401-02 (exploring related ways of assigning appellate 
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recognize the notion of discretionary review that the regional circuits 
may have already implemented de facto through devices, such as 
limitations on oral arguments and on written dispositions and enhanced 
reliance on staff, although discretionary review might not be constitu-
tional and would substantially modify the appeal of right, which has a 
lengthy, rich history.297 
b. Ninth Circuit 
Assuming that the commission will definitively determine that the 
Ninth Circuit does or will experience complications that are so 
problematic as to warrant treatment, it should assiduously explore the 
broadest feasible spectrum of potential solutions for addressing those 
difficulties. The most vexing issues that the entity must resolve are 
whether the many measures that the court has applied or might employ 
in the future will suffice, and if they will not, whether options that 
implicate Ninth Circuit realignment would improve the present or future 
circumstances of the court and the appellate system enough to justify 
implementation. It is impossible to predict exactly how the commission 
will answer these questions until the entity has comprehensively studied 
the relevant complications and applicable remedies. Nonetheless, some 
guidance can be afforded. 
i. The Efficacy of Approaches that the Ninth Circuit 
Has Applied or Might Employ 
The commission should first carefully scrutinize all of the approaches 
which the Ninth Circuit has effectuated or could use. The court has 
adopted, tested, or received most of the aforementioned past and present, 
and numerous proposed, internal and external reforms.298 The Ninth 
Circuit has been a leader in developing and employing innovative 
mechanisms to treat the problems that it faces and that the other eleven 
appellate courts confront. Moreover, the Ninth Circuit has enthusiastical-
ly experimented with, and beneficially exploited, measures that the 
remaining appeals courts have invented or instituted. 
functions to district judges and reaching similar conclusions regarding efficacy); Tobias, supra 
note 200, at 403-04. 
297. See BAKER, supra note 25, at 234-38; Robert M. Parker & Ron Chapman, Jr., 
Accepting Reality: The Time for Adopting Discretionary Review in the Courts of Appeals Has 
Arrived, 50 SMU L. REV. 573, 578-82 (1997); Tobias, supra note 7, at 1402-03; see also supra 
text accompanying notes 229-30. For more discussion of external reforms, see BAKER, supra 
note 25, at 229-86. 
298. See supra text accompanying notes 228-96. 
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The Ninth Circuit also has relied upon certain alternatives that few 
courts have applied. Prominent illustrations are the administrative units, 
Bankruptcy Appellate Panels, and the limited en bane technique, the last 
of which deserves special attention because the mechanism's efficacy is 
critical to the future of the Ninth Circuit and of the large appeals 
courts.299 The Ninth Circuit correspondingly depends on an executive 
committee, which evaluates court operating procedures and makes 
proposals for their improvement to the entire circuit and which has 
authority to act between the court's regular meetings, during emergen-
cies, and on less important matters.300 The Ninth Circuit concomitantly 
has implemented a special track for easily-concluded or less complex 
appeals that are submitted without oral argument.301 Moreover, court 
staff review all briefs and identify similar issues so that the circuit might 
consider them together and avoid conflicts, and staff conduct prebriefing 
conferences to clarify and narrow the issues for resolution and to 
explore settlement prospects.302 Furthermore, the court's enormous 
caseload has required it to maintain a substantially larger complement 
of judges than any other circuit and prompted the Judicial Conference 
to recommend that Congress authorize ten new judgeships for the 
court.303 Much information now suggests, and the commission may 
determine, that the apparent efficacy of most non-structural solutions 
that the Ninth Circuit has employed as well as its longstanding and 
future willingness to invent and test novel concepts and to experiment 
with and adopt nascent alternatives that additional courts create or study 
groups or writers propose will suffice. 
ii. The Efficacy of Structural Approaches 
for the Ninth Circuit 
If the commission conclusively finds these measures to be deficient, 
numerous ideas indicate that structural approaches might not be 
efficacious enough to deserve implementation. First, reconfiguration 
would be disruptive for several reasons that not only implicate the 
generic adverse effects on precedent and judicial administration 
mentioned above304 but also that pertain more specifically to the Ninth 
Circuit. For example, the court's division could lead to inconsistent 
299. See supra text accompanying notes 42-45, 290. 
300. See BAKER, supra note 25, at 79. 
301. See id. at 82; see also supra text accompanying notes 44-45. 
302. See supra text accompanying notes 44, 68. 
303. The court has applied many additional measures, most of which I alluded to earlier. 
See SECONDS. 956 PosmoN PAPER, supra note 77, at 4. 
304. See supra text accompanying notes 223-25. 
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application of business, maritime, and utility law in each new circuit on 
the West Coast, complicating commerce and requiring parties to 
research the precedent of multiple courts for any potential cross-circuit 
transaction.305 Splitting the court might correspondingly fragment the 
unified construction of federal laws governing natural resources and 
other fields that the circuit has consistently applied across the West.306 
The court's bifurcation also may encourage forum shopping between the 
two appellate tribunals.307 Even if realignment were less drastic and 
disruptive, as well as more effective, California's substantial population 
and caseload mean that the Ninth Circuit defies practical division; no 
felicitous way of restructuring the court has yet been devised.308 These 
difficulties, accordingly, show that the commission should not seriously 
consider reconfiguration until the entity has meticulously scrutinized a 
broad spectrum of less disruptive, and ostensibly more promising, 
possibilities and clearly concluded that they are inadequate.309 
iii. The Systemic Efficacy of Structural 
Approaches for the Ninth Circuit 
Should the commission definitively determine that realignment of the 
Ninth Circuit is in the court's best interest, the entity must carefully 
consider whether restructuring is superior for the entire appellate system. 
Several ideas which complement the general complications relating to 
precedent and judicial administration,310 suggest that division would be 
inadvisable. An important reason why reconfiguration is inappropriate 
is that Ninth Circuit bifurcation would afford virtually no systemic 
benefit.311 Splitting the court fails to remedy any significant problems 
305. See SECONDS. 956 PosmoN PAPER, supra note 77, at 5-6. 
306. See S. 948 Hearing, supra note 49, at 286 (statement of Sen. Wilson); id. at 508 
(statement of Michael Traynor). Division also could increase the fragmentation of federal law 
more generally. See supra text accompanying note 283. 
307. See SECOND S. 956 PosmoN PAPER, supra note 77, at 3. Division would require 
duplicative personnel, administration and courthouses and reduce the court's federalizing 
function and diversity. See id.; supra notes 78, 218-19 and accompanying text; see also infra 
notes 310-12 and accompanying text (affording more reasons why division is inadvisable). 
308. See infra text accompanying notes 313, 317-21. 
309. See supra text accompanying note 224 (recommending realignment "only when 
compelling empirical evidence demonstrates" adjudicative or administrative disfunction in a 
court so that it cannot continue to deliver quality justice and coherent, consistent circuit law in 
the face of increasing workload.). The court has invented or used many effective non-structural 
options which have apparently resolved its major problems. 
310. See supra text accompanying notes 223-25. 
311. See Baker, supra note 6, at 945-49; see also Alfred T. Goodwin, Splitting the Ninth 
Circuit-No Answer to Caseload Growth, OR. ST. B. BULL., Jan. 1990, at 10, 11; Tobias, supra 
note 7, at 1386-90. 
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that the circuit might be experiencing; division would simply defer 
resolution of two courts' difficulties. Distributing the current docket 
among multiple circuits will merely shift, rather than reduce, the 
workload. The total quantity of cases decided would remain identical, 
despite the number of courts that address the appeals. In short, 
bifurcating the Ninth Circuit today would minimally improve the 
appellate system. 
The Ninth Circuit also has been, and will probably continue to be, 
the exemplar for most, but especially for the large, appeals courts. For 
instance, it has been the acknowledged leader in developing and 
applying creative measures to treat the complications that many regional 
circuits do and will confront. Thus, were the Ninth Circuit restructured, 
the appellate system would lose the preeminent appeals court for 
experimenting with salutary solutions to these problems.312 Splitting 
the Ninth Circuit could correspondingly be inadvisable because division 
effectively would eliminate a primary candidate for designation as, or 
inclusion in, a jumbo appellate court, should this approach be deemed 
superior.313 Moreover, Ninth Circuit reconfiguration may prove irrevo-
cable because it might foreclose implementation of potentially effica-
cious alternatives, such as combining the twelve regional appeals courts 
into fewer jumbo circuits.314 The above examination, therefore, indi-
cates that Ninth Circuit realignment would not be best for the appellate 
system. 
iv. Analysis of Structural Approaches 
If the commission conclusively decides that the finest solution for the 
Ninth Circuit and al) of the appeals courts is restructuring the present 
Ninth Circuit, the entity should determine which reconfiguration is 
superior by consulting the numerous options that are available. The 
logical starting point would be the various approaches that Congress has 
examined over the years when considering realignment. It is important 
to remember that senators and representatives have adopted none of the 
proposals proffered partly because the court resists practical restructur-
312. See Mary M. Schroeder, Jim Browning as a Leader of Judges: A View from a 
Follower, 21 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 3, 7 (1989) (quoting Chief Judge James R. Browning). 
313. If Congress adopts any proposals for dividing the Ninth Circuit that it has seriously 
considered, the court may well remain large, and this could dilute my ideas' force. 
314. See supra text accompanying notes 253, 311. These problems indicate that the 
commission should only seriously evaluate realignment once it has exhausted many, less 
dramatic and disruptive, and more promising, prospects. Ideas in this paragraph will have more 
future importance if caseload growth and congressional and judicial inaction essentially continue 
so that the other circuits increasingly resemble the Ninth Circuit See supra text accompanying 
note 226. 
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ing. This situation can be ascribed substantially to the California 
conundrum. The state is responsible for more than a majority of Ninth 
Circuit cases, and the only effective way to treat California is by 
creating a one-state appellate court or by dividing California and 
assigning some of its four federal districts to different appeals courts; 
both prospects are essentially unprecedented and would impose 
disadvantages. 315 
The most general possibilities for reconfiguring the· Ninth Circuit 
include trifurcation and bifurcation. Fashioning three appellate courts 
warrants limited evaluation because the commission will probably find 
that this potential remedy is comparatively ineffective. For example, the 
insufficiently large caseload and certain administrative and political 
realities, including the expense and replication of management structures 
seemingly make trifurcation infeasible, although a few senators did 
allude to the idea during the July 1997 floor debate.316 
Some observers have advanced and analyzed numerous methods of 
bifurcating the Ninth Circuit. One prominent illustration is the establish-
ment of a new appeals court comprising the five states of the Pacific 
Northwest, although this alternative would unequally apportion the 
current docket.317 A related, recent proposal would add Arizona to 
these jurisdictions, but the approach fails to cure the imbalanced case 
distribution or to honor the notion of contiguity, which the Hruska 
Commission posited as an important criterion for creating appellate 
courts.318 
Additional options frontally attack the problems, particularly 
implicating appeals, that California's great magnitude imposes. One 
controversial suggestion would divide the state and place certain of its 
districts in a specific regional circuit and the remainder in another.319 
The potential for each appellate court to interpret California law 
differently might prove troubling.320 The Hruska Commission and a 
few writers have deemphasized the significance of possible conflicts 
partly because a similar situation presently obtains in the regional cir-
cuits. 321 Nonetheless, the prospect of splitting California has engen-
dered relatively limited support. 
315. See infra text accompanying notes 317-21. 
316. See, e.g., 143 CONG. REc. 88041, 88044 (daily ed. July 24, 1997) (statement of Sen. 
Gorton). 
317. See S. 948, lOlst Cong., 1st Sess. (1990); S. 956, 104th Cong., 2d Sess. (1995); see 
also supra text accompanying notes 47-84. 
318. See supra text accompanying notes 21, 57-58. 
319. See HRUSKA COMMISSION, supra note 2, at 238-39; see also supra text accompanying 
note 24. 
320. See HRUSKA COMMISSION, supra note 2, at 238-39. 
321. See id.; see also Hellman, supra note 24, at 1281. 
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A second alternative that similarly attempts to allocate the docket 
more evenly would be an appeals court which consists exclusively or 
essentially of California. The Hruska Commission found that a one-state 
circuit could lack the diversity which judges who have practiced and 
lived in different states afford.322 The entity expressed concern that a 
lone senator who served multiple terms and was actively involved in 
judicial appointments might shape a court for an entire generation.323 
These disadvantages mean that this approach has received little serious 
consideration. 
It also would be possible to reconfigure the Ninth Circuit by 
transferring states that are currently included in the court to other 
regional circuits, namely the Eighth or Tenth Circuits. For example, 
some observers have periodically entertained the idea of moving Arizona 
to the Tenth Circuit, and a few senators broached that proposition as 
recently as 1995.324 A related option might be the establishment of an 
appellate court comprising the states of the intermountain West, which 
are presently situated in the Ninth and Tenth Circuits.325 Those alterna-
tives have secured minimal support because they apparently have been 
deemed quite unconventional. 
In the final analysis, the existing Ninth Circuit seemingly defies 
feasible realignment. Much information now suggests, and the commis-
sion may well find, that the preferable approach would be to leave the 
court as currently constituted and attempt to improve it through 
continued application of the many effective mechanisms that the circuit 
has employed and through implementation of numerous efficacious 
measures that other courts have used or that study groups or writers 
have suggested. The ideal mix of reforms cannot be conclusively 
identified until the entity has completed its evaluation; however, I can 
proffer some guidance. 
Devices, such as administrative units, Bankruptcy Appellate Panels, 
and computerized issue coding, that clearly have been beneficial deserve 
ongoing use. 326 Options, including the limited en bane procedure and 
substantial reliance on staff, that have yielded unclear, and even 
controversial, results,327 and alternatives, such as the appellate commis-
sioner,328 that appear promising probably warrant continued employ-
322. See HRUSKA COMMISSION, supra note 2, at 237. The commission characterized this 
attribute as a "highly desirable, and perhaps essential, condition" for creating circuits. See id.; 
see also supra text accompanying notes 65, 218, 293. 
323. See HRUSKA COMMISSION, supra note 2, at 237. 
324. See id. at 236-37; supra note 124. 
325. See HRUSKA COMMISSION, supra note 2, at 236-37; Tobias, supra note 293, at 596. 
326. See supra text accompanying notes 42, 68, 290. 
327. See supra text accompanying notes 43-45, 300-01. 
328. See supra text accompanying note 254. 
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ment or experimentation with close assessment of their effectiveness. 
The commission's examination also should clarify the efficacy of 
various techniques that the regional appellate courts and the Ninth 
Circuit have applied. 329 
An important set of actions that Congress and President Clinton 
could implement in the near term involves the infusion of resources. 
One significant form that this activity might assume is the expeditious 
appointment of judges for the Ninth Circuit's ten vacancies. Another is 
seriously considering authorization of the nine new judgeships recom-
mended by the Judicial Conference. Congress correspondingly could 
approve more non-judicial personnel for the court. These increased 
resources would be responsive to concerns regarding the time that the 
Ninth Circuit consumes in deciding appeals; however, additional judges 
and staff may impose certain disadvantages, such as intracircuit 
inconsistency and greater bureaucratization. 330 
If the commission definitively concludes that the Ninth Circuit must 
be restructured, the entity should assess the potential reconfigurations 
canvassed above, and any new realignments that it can develop, in light 
of several criteria. One helpful group of standards is the factors that the 
Hruska Commission articulated a quarter century ago, most of which 
have much continuing validity.331 For example, the ideas that appeals 
courts should be comprised of at least three contiguous states and ought 
to include jurisdictions with diverse populations, legal business, and 
socioeconomic interests retain considerable vitality today. The commis-
sion also must attempt to divide the caseload evenly between the 
proposed courts and to allocate judgeships in a manner that affords each 
new regional circuit sufficient members to ensure the prompt, fair, 
inexpensive, and consistent resolution of appeals.332 
III. CONCLUSION 
Congress recently authorized a Commission on Structural Alterna-
tives for the Federal Courts of Appeals. This entity must capitalize on 
its valuable opportunity to analyze comprehensively the regional circuits 
and formulate constructive recommendations that will enable the courts 
to treat the crisis of volume. If the commission systematically evaluates 
the problems that the regional circuits do and will face and efficacious 
remedies to these difficulties, the courts should be able to solve the 
complications that they will confront in the next century. 
329. The Ninth Circuit also may want to review measures which other courts have 
successfully applied or which study groups or writers have proposed, and this survey could 
reveal mechanisms that the Ninth Circuit might profitably implement or test. 
330. See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 273-78. 
331. See supra note 21. 
332. See Tobias, supra note 7, at 1410-11; Tobias, supra note 293, at 600. 
